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ABSTRACT
Colombia's severe low-income housing shortage has fostered the
proliferation of an informal housing sector which has provided constantly
changing approaches. This shortage, joined with the irrepressible growth of
many principal cities which have made land scarce and valuable, has fostered
the existence of a "sub market" that, unlike squatting, involves an actual sale
transaction. The subdivisions which result are illegal because: 1) Developers
generally give the buyer a "deed of sale" of land that they do not own, 2)
Developers usually violate the land-use plans in the sense that the subdivision is
most often located in flood areas or dangerous zones. 3) Developers generally
violate the subdivision ordinance by providing undersized lots or not providing
infrastructure.
The settlements resulting from this "sub market" are called pirate
subdivisions. This thesis, through the use of literature, newspaper files,
interviews and empirical material, examines the positive aspects, the evolution
and the reasons underlying pirate existence together with the government's
response to "counteract" the existence of these type of settlements.
In the conclusion I question the government's response and its policies in
attempting to lure pirates away from the market by fostering similar kinds of
developments. I believe that, although pirate settlements do have traits that
make them better than invasion settlements and government sponsored
projects, the government should not try to develop similar kinds of settlements in
a legal context (developing similar settlements following regulations), because
many of the characteristics that pirate settlements have are intrinsic from an
illegal context, and thus can not be mimicked in the legal context.
I believe that the condition of illegality (not following government's
regulations from the beginning) makes pirate settlements behave in the way they
do. Government in this sense will never be able to reproduce pirate settlements,
and thus its efforts to develop these type of settlements are and will always be
unfruitful. I am proposing a different perspective on the issue; that "illegal" is not
necessary "bad" and "legal" not necessary "good". Ideally both sectors can
coexist, with the "legal" sector serving the low to middle-class and the "illegal"
sector serving the lowest class that cannot afford government sponsored
housing.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Lisa Redfield Peattie
Title: Professor Emeritus, Ph. D.
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INTRODUCTION
Various calculations have been made to find the exact number of
dwellings needed to house low-income people in Colombia. Although most of
the figures do not coincide, one thing is clear, "The dwelling problem is a serious
one... and the shortage instead of decreasing, has increased and continues
growing at unbelievable rates."'
As a result of this shortage an informal sector was born. This sector has
responded in with multiple strategies in attempting to provide dwellings for those
in need, ranging from free-floating processes of invasion to more organized
ones. As a result, in part, for the increased number of invasions and of the
irrepressible growth of many cities which has created a land shortage, and thus a
very valuable asset (land), a new type of development was fostered (specially in
Santa Fe de Bogota, the capital city, and other principal Colombian cities such
as Cali and Medellin): pirate subdivisions. Pirate subdivisions are settlements
which involve an "intermediary" or "developer" which sells plots of land to
settlers. This sale is illegal because: 1) developers generally give the buyer a
"deed of sale" of land that they do not own; 2) developers usually violate the
land-use plans in the sense that the subdivision is often located in flood areas or
dangerous zones. 3) developers generally violate the subdivision ordinances by
providing lots that are too small and/or not furnishing infrastructure.
The government, in turn, has responded to this kind of settlements in
several ways: 1) It has tried eradicating these settlements by the use of force. 2)
It has tried legalizing (making existing settlements legitimate) the pirates
subdivisions 3) It has tried to get them out of the market by taking away their
demand, mimicking them and providing similar kinds of developments.
This thesis examines the response that the informal sector has given to
house the poor, centering specially upon pirate developments, since these
settlements are the most recent ones. This thesis examines the positive aspects,
the evolution, and the reasons underlying pirate existence together with the
government's response to "counteract" the existence of this type of settlements.
At the end this thesis question's the Colombian government's response
and policies in attempting to get pirates away from the market by fostering similar
kinds of developments. I believe that although pirate settlements do have traits
that make them better than invasion settlements and government sponsored
projects, the government should not try to develop similar kinds of settlements in
a legal context (developing similar settlements following regulations), because
'El Espectador. March 27,1994. Separata, "Vivienda Social: Resultados Precarios."
many of the traits and characteristics that pirate settlements have are intrinsic to
illegal context, and thus can not be extrapolated from this one.
I believe that the condition of illegality (opposing governmental
regulations) makes pirate settlements behave in the way they do. Government
in this sense will never be able to mimic pirate settlements, and thus its efforts to
develop these type of settlements are totally unfruitful. I am proposing a different
perspective on the issue; that "illegal" is not necessary "bad" and "legal" not
necessary "good". Ideally both sectors can coexist, with the "legal" sector
serving the low to middle-class and the "illegal" sector serving the lowest class
that cannot afford government-sponsored housing.
Through a review of the existing literature on the topic, the use of
newspaper files and interviews I concluded, this thesis will answer the following
questions:
CHAPTER ONE
ARE PIRATE SUBDIVISIONS "BEST"?
The first chapter provides a comparative view of the traits of invasion,
government sponsored and pirate settlements to highlight the positive results
created by each, especially the positive results brought about by pirate
developments.
CHAPTER TWO
HOW DID PIRATE SUB-DIVISIONS CAME INTO BEING?
The second chapter presents a more grounded and multi-dimensional view of
the evolution of informal settlements (invasions and pirate subdivisions). It
illuminates the history of how pirate settlements came into being.
CHAPTER THREE
WHY DO "PIRATES" TAKE THE HOUSING BURDEN FROM THE
GOVERNMENT AND HANDLE THE PROBLEM THEMSELVES?
Chapter three deals specifically with the reasons behind the existence of pirate
developers. The main concept in this chapter is to prove that this "business" is
indeed economically and politically profitable.
CHAPTER FOUR
HOW HAS THE GOVERNMENT RESPONDED TO PIRATE SETTLEMENTS?
How has the government responded and what has been its role in changing this
pattern of behavior? This chapter presents a discussion on the basic responses
that the government has made through time to "combat" pirate subdivisions.
CHAPTER FIVE
WHY DOES THE GOVERNMENT "PERMIT" PIRATE SETTLEMENTS?
An increase of pirate settlements can only be explained by considering the
government's support of them or government's inability to eradicate them. This
chapter explores the governments' reliance on 'negative' attitudes toward pirate
developments by hypothesizing from empirical material why this behavior occurs.
The theories discussed in this chapter are formulated by this author.
CHAPTER SIX
IF PIRATE SETTLEMENTS GENERATE SOLID PROFITS, WHY DOESN'T
GOVERNMENT MIMIC THEM?
This chapter aims to explain why the formal sector has not been able to act like
the informal sector. This chapter asks why the government has not been able to
successfully mimic pirate developments.
METHODOLOGY
Description of Research
The data presented for this thesis comes from:
1. Books and studies concerning this matter.
2. Document research in municipal offices and newspaper files.
3. Interviews with people who have worked in this field, government
officials, settlers of different settlements, politicians, urban planners, etc.
in Colombia.
1). Books and Studies
The bibliography includes all of the sources used.
2). Document Research
-municipal offices
The principal sources for document research in municipal offices were:
National Department for Planning , District Department for Planning of Santa Fe
de Bogota, and the National Institute for Urban Reform (Inurbe) .
-newspaper files
The primary newspaper file used for the document search was: 'El
Espectador'. The search that was done was made from January 1991 till
December 1994 of the following topics: social interest housing, dwelling credit,
National Institute for the Urban Reform (Inurbe) and pirate developments. The
documents used can be found in a list presented following the bibliography.
3). Interviews
-people who have worked in the field
-municipal officials, former and present
I conducted oral interviews with people who worked in the field and with
municipal officials identified prior to the start of this research. Follow-up
interviews were also conducted when necessary. A list of these interviews is
presented at the end of Abstract 1A.
-settlers
Since the interviews conducted with settlers were used mainly to develop
the first chapter, details concerning this matter can be found in the next section,
which deals more directly with the way this chapter was structured.
Chapter 1
In the first chapter a comparative analysis was done between 'invasion',
'government sponsored' and 'pirate' settlements. These three categories were
used following one of the most serious of recent studies conducted by the
Inurbe (Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Urbana - National Institute of the Urban
Reform), called "Inventory of 'Below-normal' Zones". This study includes the
largest record of settlements which do not include the housing standards
considered 'normal' and actually makes the division of 'invasion', 'government
sponsored' and 'pirate'between settlements. These three categories thus, exist,
although some settlements are actually considered a mixture of two or three of
these land processes.
To develop this particular section of the study, the classifications of Inurbe
were used as a basis for selection. One and sometimes two settlements were
picked from this list from which to interview settlers. These settlements were
picked because they had 'representative' characteristics according to various
officials from Inurbe. Although it is clear that the settlements selected correspond
to each of the categories, it is questionable if the data from these settlements
should be regarded as the most representative due to the narrow basis of
selection, to the small number of settlements picked for this study and to the
small number of interviews conducted. The results, however, seem to be reliable
since they seem to agree with studies conducted by other scholars in this field.
Also, the case studies used in the different studies, especially Blaesser's and
Russell's, proved to be valuable since they were used as a means of
exemplifying the issues brought out in this discussion. It is important to point out
that the first chapter of this study tends to over generalize in many respects to
provide a comprehensive framework for understanding these land settlement
processes ('invasion', 'government sponsored' and 'pirate').
This chapter stems from interviews with easily accessible people
conducted in the street or in people's dwellings; no technical means of selection
was used. This chapter includes the authors interpretation of their stories and
experiences. In other words, this part of the study can not be regarded as
product of a technical and/or statistical analysis. It should be looked upon as a
study which gives another point of view, which combines new ideas and different
ways of looking at a problem. This type of study is valuable in that it is able to
capture valuable material and ideas from informal interviews, which by no means
are "scientific", but provide valuable anecdotal information from dwellers in these
developments.
Details concerning the interviews conducted are presented in abstract 1A.
CHAPTER ONE
ARE PIRATE SUBDIVISIONS "BEST"?
The first chapter provides a comparative view of the traits of invasion,
government sponsored and pirate settlements to highlight the positive results
created by each, especially the positive results brought about by pirate
developments.
The first part of this chapter will define and explain how the three different
type of land developments are used in this particular chapter: 'invasion',
'government sponsored' and 'pirate.' The second part of this chapter will give the
author's analysis of these three settlements using the following criteria:
a) Flexibility to the changing needs of individual households.
b) Affordability and cost phasing over time.
c) Optimal provision of services for dwellers.
d) Location to suit general 'social interests', such as preserving green
space, conforming with existing public facilities and services, etc.
e) Sense of community created through the settlement process.
I. PART 1: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INVASION, GOVERNMENT
SPONSORED AND PIRATE LAND SETTLEMENTS
A. INVASION SETTLEMENTS
Invasion settlements are land occupations created by individuals or
groups of individuals who first squat on and later take control of public or private
lands. In this process, land is usually acquired for free, since the settlers
themselves seize the land and occupy it. This settlement is illegal because: 1) it
violates land tenure (the land which gets occupied generally does not belong to
the settlers), 2) it violates land-use plans (settlements of this type usually get
built in dangerous zones), 3) it violates the subdivision ordinance by having little
infrastructure or too small lots. The basic characteristics of this type of land
occupation, according to a study made by the National Department of District
Planning are:
1. Fast and clandestine planning
2. Settlers elect the invasion zone
3. Knowledge of the legal conditions of the invaded land
4. An organized invasion group
5. Training to settle as fast as possible.
7. Fast construction with very light materials for temporary occupancy or with
possibilities of recovery and improvement if the seizure is successfu 2
These kinds of developments have become more sophisticated over time,
and involve more planning, and a higher degree of organization and interest in
dwelling design. It seems as if their aim is to become more comparable with
government sponsored developments. For the purpose of this chapter, however,
invasion settlements will be referred to only those type of developments which
have evolved in the conventional "seize and control" method as described
above. In other words the invasions that will be described in this chapter refer
only to the first attempts made by dwellers, when these were highly disorganized.
B. GOVERNMENT SPONSORED SETTLEMENTS
A second type of Colombian land settlements have a legal origin, in the
sense that they: 1) do not violate land tenure, 2) do not violate land-use plans
and 3)do not violate the subdivision ordinance. These settlements are the ones
that the government has developed and thus, conform to legal regulations. The
government has provided a range of options to respond to the low-income
housing problem which paradoxically have been changing to resemble informal
dwellings (while informal settlements seem to resemble formal settlements).
For the purpose of this chapter, the settlements described are those which
the government has sponsored and developed in a conventional manner, (the
2Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Nacional, Centro de Comunicaciones. December
13/16 1966. Seminario de Tugurios. Bogota. p. 2.
first attempts made by government) dictated by government agencies as
described by urban planner James Mackenzie: they are those "which the agency
determines procedures, the type of operation or methodology to deal with the
problem, distribution of funds, construction standards and cost, financing and
subsidies, and the selection and adjudication of the potential dweller(s)." 3
Although the planning procedures of a project may have some variables, a
normal procedure is outlined below:
1. Analysis of regional needs and standards. Determination of norms and
appropriate housing typologies.
2. Budget sources and distribution modes.
3. Acquisition of land tracts in accordance with regional plans.
4. Design of urban layout and appropriate housing typologies.
5. Preparation of construction documents.
6. Bidding process and selection of construction company. In some cases
the agency might be the general contractor.
7. Control, certification and payment to the construction company.
8. Acceptance and approval of the finished dwelling.
9. Selection of the future dweller.
10. If the project is composed of high-rise apartment buildings, internal
managing committee must be organized.
11. The administration and management of loan payments.
12. Control of the dwelling and its intended uses.4
3Mackenzie, James Russel. 1987. "The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Alternatives in the
Context of Rapid Urban Growth: A Case Study of Bogota", UM|. p.11.
41bid. p.13.
C. PIRATE SETTLEMENTS
Pirate sub-divisions are another form of land occupation. This form is
different from the invasion system in that an intermediary who sells the plots of
land giving promises of sale is present. In other words, the dwellers, in contrast
to invasion settlements, pay a monetary price for this land sometimes tricked
and fooled and other times knowing that this land violates the subdivision
ordinance. These kinds of settlements are illegal in the sense that: 1) The pirate
or developer often subdivides land that he does not own, in some cases being a
pure swindler which actually does not give anything to the settlers, 2) The pirate
sometimes violates land-use plans, selling lots in flood or hill side areas which
sometimes prove dangerous for the settlers, 3) The pirate often violates the
subdivision ordinance by having no infrastructure and small lots which do not
comply with the city regulations.5
There are various types of 'pirates' including those whose behavior might
be better explained by their economic constrains and ignorance, rather than by a
calculated desire to circumvent the authorities. "To this classification belong
those subdivisions whose owners may well have had an honest understanding of
their duties and obligations as developers, and later, for personal or general
economic reasons did not comply with their obligation." 6 Others are regarded as
pirates because their behavior violates government regulations in the sense that
they do not meet exact deadlines set by the state, as many private developer
companies do when they start construction with no licenses. The "pirate"
developments referred to in this chapter, in contrast, are the ones in which the
developer has the desire of bypassing legal authorities from the beginning.
51nterview, Professor Bill Doeble, May 18, 1995.6Mosquera and Hinestrosa. 1976. Diagonostico General sobre el Problema de la Vivienda en
Medellin. Medellin: Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion y S.T. p. 5
II. PART 2: THE INTRINSIC CHARACTERISTICS BETWEEN INVASION,
GOVERNMENT SPONSORED & PIRATE LAND SETTLEMENTS
A. ADAPTABILITY TO THE CHANGING NEEDS OF INDIVIDUAL
HOUSEHOLDS
INVASION SETTLEMENTS
It is my hypothesis that dwellings generated through processes of invasion
usually adapt very well to the changing needs of the individual households due to
several aspects. First, since these dwellings are designed and made by the
dwellers who live in them, they usually meet individual needs very accurately.
This type of settlement often generates a variety of solutions where each
dwelling is unique and offers a diversity of possibilities. This can be seen in
barrio 'Las Colinas' (Appendix One/1), where each dwelling has a different
design. Usually these settlements provide the needed flexibility to adjust to the
settlers' needs. Many dwellings, for example, are not only places in which to live,
but provide working facilities.
In a second instance, since these types of settlements are built at first with
temporary materials which later are replaced by more durable materials7, it is my
hypothesis that they evolve through a design process which changes with the
needs of the dwellers. According to Rumberto Zambrano, barrio 'Zarzamora'
took only a couple of hours to build. Over time, settlers are forced to replace
these materials with 'new' ones since they wear out and erode quickly. Analysts
say that settlers start with durable materials because they plan to stay, others
say that durable materials are used at the start as a way of preventing eviction.
Whatever the reason, with time and according to budgets, these dwellings go
through a process of transformation.
71nterview with Jose Miguel Alba, Planeacion Distrital, December 15, 1994.
GOVERNMENT SPONSORED SETTLEMENTS
It is my belief that government sponsored settlements have a difficult time
changing to meet individual needs, since they evolve from a completely different
process than the invasion process. Government sponsored settlements are the
product of a design process carried out by a group of professionals, who
hypothesize, according to data gathered from settlements of similar types, about
the needs of the future settlers.8 Their ideas are usually focused on generalized
concepts, and thus, the design usually ends up being one which is used as a
'cookie cutter' or 'model' to develop all the dwellings. Sometimes designs have
been developed to offer some flexibility by allowing different alternatives but
these do not seem to go beyond the superficial. An example is in the
neighborhood called "Doce de Octubre". This settlement offers three types of
housing, Types A, B, and C on a lot of 72 square meters with slight variations.
(The design schemes can be found in Appendix One/2 of this study.) Another
settlement that serves to exemplify this issue might be "Francisco Antonio Zea,"
which offers a different type of solution for higher income people with only one
design. (The design scheme for this development can be found in Appendix
One/3.)
The materials used in the 'cookie-cutter designs' are usually durable, and
provide little space for change.9 Settlers usually adjust their dwelling to fit their
needs but these changes are mostly superficial due to the difficulty in executing
them.
PIRATE SETTLEMENTS
I believe that pirate settlements actually adjust very well to changing
individual needs, and that they actually meet dweller's needs better than invasion
and government sponsored settlements. Pirate settlements provide the dweller
with the option of making his or her own design, or of seeking professional help
if he can afford it.10 This option actually gives the settlers the elasticity found in
invasion settlements, while providing them with the benefits of professional help.
8lnterview with Jose Manuel Escolar, Planeacion Distrital, December 10, 1994.9lbid.
101bid.
It is my hypothesis that settlers are able to choose the design of their dwelling
because pirate settlements offer a long time span which gives settlers plenty of
time to construct their dwellings, as opposed to the short time period allowed for
invasion dwellings. In contrast to government sponsored settlements, dwellers of
pirate developments do not have to buy their dwellings finished, but have some
input in their design. Blaesser in his study makes a comparison between the
I.C.T. projects, as "Doce de Octubre" and "Castilla La Vieja," a pirate settlement.
In regard to this matter he says: The positive aspects seen in "Castilla La Vieja"
by some Medellin planners (especially in contrast to such I.C.T. projects as
"Doce de Octubre"), are that the subdivision is generally well laid out, (see
Appendix One/4) although lacking open space, and that residents had flexibility
to expand their construction to two or three stories to rent the additional space.1
Differences in design can be illustrated by the examples of floor plans
made by residents of "La Cascada" (see Appendix One/5). In these schemes,
the designs vary in lot size and in distribution. The importance of space is also
quite different. Various levels of significance are given to the different spaces of
the house including the patio, living room and bedrooms.
Materials used are of both kinds: temporal and durable, suggesting that
these types of settlements are subject to change, especially in the non-structural
parts, which are often constructed from durable materials. In addition, it is my
hypothesis that this type of settlement provides the individual with the option of
settling with a small change at the start, if he decides to construct with durable
materials, or of dealing with big changes later, if he decides to build with more
temporary materials.
11Blaesser, Brian William. 1979. "The Private Market and the Process of Lower Income
Urbanization in Colombia: The Pirate Housing Submarket of Medellin. Brian William Blaesser:
Boston. p. D-1
B. AFFORDABILITY AND COST PHASING OVER TIME
In general, the value of a dwelling is comprised of two costs, the price
paid for the land and the value of the dwelling by itself. "In a relatively free
property market, the price of land consists of four principal components: (1) the
value of land in agricultural condition; (2) the cost of developing and servicing
land for urban uses (roads, water, sewers, etc.); (3) the increment over
agricultural value paid to obtain the land for urban use; (4) the premium paid for
land whose location in contrast to peripheral areas provides greater accessibility
to the city."12 The three types of land developments bear these costs in different
ways.
INVASION SETTLEMENTS
Of the three type of settlements, invasion settlements, according to my
belief, are probably cheapest for dwellers and for the government.13 Dwellers do
not pay any of the land price components just described, and thus, only pay for
the materials needed to construct their dwelling. The initial cost of these
materials is relatively small initially since building materials bought are temporary
(usually being cardboard, styrofoam, tin and plastic). What generally happens is
that an informal market forms in which these materials are actually bought and
sold. Later on, when the settlers decide to replace them, the price is easily
handled since the rate of replacement is set by the settlers, according to their
budgets.
I believe that for the government invasion settlements incur a relatively
small cost. The government bears the cost of the value of land in agricultural
condition depending on whether the settlement is built on official land, the cost of
servicing it for urban uses and the cost involved in making these settlements
legal, that is, declaring a subdivision to be legitimate; skipping the cost of the
dwelling unit and of the hazards brought about by its construction. The cost of
the land is generally small since this land often does not appear in municipal files
12G. Neutze. 1973. The Price of Land and Land Use Planning: Policy Instruments in the Urban
Land Market. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Paris. pp.1-2.
13lnterview with Jose Miguel Alba, Planeacion Distrital, December 15, 1994.
and thus, is worthless in the eyes of the government, at least at the time is
occupied.14
GOVERNMENT SPONSORED SETTLEMENTS
Government sponsored settlements, in contrast, seem to be consistently
more expensive. Many of the people interviewed have wanted to live in these
type of settlements but have not been able to afford them. Government
sponsored settlements offer settlers two basic options: buying only a plot of land
or buying the land with the dwelling.15 The land is usually sold at unaffordable
prices since it has the added cost of urban value paid to obtain the land for urban
use; which most of the times is linked to a form of payment which is unaffordable
to them. In other words, government sponsored settlements are sold when they
are already sitting in urban land and thus, the dwellers are the ones which pay
the increment of buying urban instead or rural land. Pirate subdivisions in
contrast, sell agricultural land, and thus it is bought by settlers at a much lower
price. The increment of price in the land when it becomes part of the city
actually becomes a profit for the settler, instead of profiting the developer. A
table provided by Blaesser's study serves clearly to exemplify this issue. In this
table the author made a comparison between the government housing market
and the pirate housing market in Medellin settlements between 1972 and 1976.
It is clear by this chart that the projects made by the government sold at much
higher prices than the ones sold by pirate developers. The down payments for
government sponsored plots are clearly more. For example while the I.C.T.
projects had down payments of $3,000, $9,800. $10,000 and $17,000, pirate
developments had down payments of $1,500. and $2,000 (see Appendix
One/6).
Land that can be subdivided and used for urban purposes is expensive
because it is inside of the urban perimeter (or at least has the expectation of
being inside), a characteristic which rises the prices enormously since prices
vary vastly between serviced and unserviced land. The diagram presented in
Appendix One/7 clearly shows this difference. Government sponsored
141nterview with Jose Miguel Alba, Planeacion Distrital, December 15, 1994.
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settlements are thus not able to sell developments to the lower class unless they
are subsidized, a situation which often leaves the 'lowest sector' of the lower
class un-housed.
For the government, the construction of these types of projects has been
expensive, which is one of the underlying reasons, according to my beliefs, for
the decline of these type of projects. Large amounts of government money
provided for the construction of government sponsored housing developments
often ended out in the hands of different middlemen and swindlers and not
necessarily in the project. The administrative structure that the government
needed to build these type of projects was too large and to expensive to be
worth doing.16
PIRATE SETTLEMENTS
I believe that pirate settlements are more expensive for the dwellers than
invasion settlements, since the land must be purchased. This cost, however, is
much lower than that of government sponsored settlements since the land, when
sold to settlers, is outside of the urban perimeter and thus much cheaper than
land which is inside the urban perimeter (can be used for urban purposes). In
other words, the value of pirate land is slightly higher than the value of the land in
agricultural condition, but not as high as land zoned for urban use. The terms of
payment for pirate land are usually more accessible than those of government
sponsored settlements. It can be said that the cost and the forms of payment
for plots of land vary to fit each budget. 17 Blaesser in his study of the pirate
subdivision "La Cascada" says in reference to this issue:
"As stipulated, the purchase terms gave the purchaser the flexibility
of paying as little as 100 pesos in a given month if his finances
were tight; he could make up the difference in subsequent
months."18
16 Interview with Jose Miguel Alba, Planeacion Distrital, December 15, 1994.
17lnterview with Jose Miguel Alba, Planeacion Distrital, December 15, 1994.
18Blaesser, Brian William. 1979. "The Private Market and the Process of Lower Income
Urbanization in Colombia: The Pirate Housing Submarket of Medellin. Brian William Blaesser:
Boston. p. 72.
In addition, the investment made in the construction of dwellings often
varies. This is seen in a table provided by Blaesser where the total amount of
investment varied from 1,000 to 40,000 pesos (see Appendix One/8). In the
interviews conducted for this study it was also found out that sometimes people
were able to pay in species; e.g. t.v.s, radios, etc.
It is my hypothesis that the cost of pirate settlements for the government
is much less, in general terms, than the cost generated by invasion and
government sponsored settlements. The cost the government must cover is
basically the cost of developing and servicing the land for urban use and
legalizing the settlement (making the settlement legitimate) which must be done
eventually. The provision of services is much easier and less expensive than
require invasion settlements when they are legalized. I believe it is easier
because the layout of pirate settlements, according to my findings, is often less
complicated and is more congruent with the urban pattern. This is the case of
barrio "El Diamante" where the layout follows a reticular pattern often used in the
city, which proves to be easier for installing services than settlements laid out in
other ways (see Appendix One/9). Pirate settlements usually cost less than
official projects because the government only provides the land (sometimes)
and the services, (since the dwelling gets paid by the dwellers).
C. OPTIMAL PROVISION OF SERVICES FOR DWELLERS
INVASION SETTLEMENTS
Invasion settlements often have problems with services such as sewer,
water supply, etc. since these settlements are begun with no services. Settlers
usually have to wait a long time before they get installed.19 It is very often
difficult to install services later because invasion settlements, according to my
findings, almost always do not follow technical criteria which facilitates service
installation. Often times invasion settlements are located in areas below sewer
levels. When services get installed, especially in these areas, they usually fail to
function correctly and settlers are forced to poor services.
19lnterview with Jose Miguel Alba, Planeacion Distrital, December 15, 1994.
GOVERNMENT SPONSORED SETTLEMENTS
Government sponsored settlements are well planned and follow the
necessary criteria to function well. They are generally built with the services
imbedded, so they often function correctly and do not face the problems faced in
pirate or invasion developments.20  The table in Appendix One/6 clearly
illustrates this issue: In the 'barrios' of the ICT, "12 de Octubre", and "Zea" all of
the services were provided while none were provided in the 'pirate'
developments, "El Diamante" and "La Cascada". The problem with government
sponsored settlements more often arises not from the way in which the
settlement was conceived, but due to money shortages which can cause
projects to end up with poor services and poor quality materials.21
PIRATE SETTLEMENTS
It is my belief that pirate settlements are probably not well functioning as
government sponsored settlements are but they are much better than invasion
settlements in regard to utilities. Pirate settlements are better off than invasion
settlements because they generally follow a more 'technical' process which
actually makes the dwelling layout blend in easier with the layout of public
utilities. They often follow a more technical approach, although with no services
imbedded, because the pirates or developers make these settlements resemble
government sponsored settlements in order to sell them. Services are not
delivered as 'fast' as in government sponsored settlements because they have to
undergo a process of becoming 'legal' (meaning that they have to under come a
process in which they first are declared to be legitimate settlements in order to
become part of the city and thus request for public utilities) that often takes a
long time. An example of this can be seen in barrio "Las Colinas" which is laid
out so differently that providing utility services will probably mean destroying a
good deal of the settlement. Mr. Guzman, worker of Planeacion Distrital, and
currently assisting in the legalization (making existent settlements comply with
legal regulations) of various settlements in Bogota, believes that it is easier to
20lnterview with Jose Miguel Alba, Planeacion Distrital, December 15, 1994.
21Ibid.
incorporate services to barrios with a 'pirate' origin than to barrios that are the
product of 'invasion' processes.
D. LOCATION TO SUIT GENERAL SOCIAL INTERESTS
INVASION SETTLEMENTS
Invasion settlements usually leave small pieces of land or no space at all
for public facilities.22 I believe green space is rare since it is not regarded as a
priority, especially at the onset when the most important goal is to stay on the
occupied land. These settlements, thus, according to my findings, provide vital
necessities and no non essential ones such as aesthetics and public space in
general. Public facilities that become necessary with time such as schools and
medical centers usually get built later by adapting the sites when needed. In
this form, a dwelling might change its use to become a school, clinic, etc.23
GOVERNMENT SPONSORED SETTLEMENTS
Government sponsored settlements often set aside some amount of land
for communitary use since these settlements are planned to respond to the
community's needs, such as education, recreation, leisure, etc. In some
settlements, however, these open 'spaces' actually become invaded by dwellings
or altered to serve other purposes.24 "Barrio Garces Navas" for example, was
planned to have a basic nuclei of linear grouped dwellings centered around a
common park for recreational use or varied services. Although the park
facilitates some activities, many communitary services are seldom developed
(the layout can be seen in Appendix One/10).25 I believe that changes in use
generally occurs when the land is left with little or no use. In other words, land
which serves a useful purpose is usually defended by its habitants, preventing a
22lnterview with Jose Miguel Alba, Planeacion Distrital, December 15, 1994.
231nterview Marco Suarez, Barrio La Loma, , November 25, 1995.
241nterview with Jose Miguel Alba, Planeacion Distrital, December 15,1994.
25Mackenzie, James Russel. 1987. "The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Alternatives in the
Context of Rapid Urban Growth: A Case Study of Bogota", UMI. p. 106.
change in its use. Government sponsored settlements play a useful role in
planning for green and recreation spaces because they often develop a sense
of respect for the land.26
PIRATE SETTLEMENTS
Since pirate settlements mimic government sponsored settlements in
many ways, it is my hypothesis, 'planners' usually try to set a piece of land to be
devoted to communitary use. This means that green space and often some
type of public facility is left open in the design. According to my findings, settlers,
as in government sponsored settlements, often respect this use, since they feel
they actually own a piece of it as well as their lot or dwelling.
E. SENSE OF COMMUNITY CREATED BY THE
SETTLEMENT PROCESS
INVASION SETTLEMENTS
It is my hypothesis that communitary links developed in invasion
settlements are usually very strong since they have a common reason that brings
them together: the risk of eviction. Usually settlers know each other before they
actually settle because they have participated in its occupation and planning.
Settlers, as explained by Maria Isabel Medina, a current settler of barrio
'Policarpa' who participated in its occupation, occupy the land forming small
groups composed of very close friends and/or relatives. She remembers that her
first neighbors at that time were her uncle, her mother and father-in-law.
After they settle, these links become even stronger as forced to face the
problems they are subject to for having developed on land that they do not own
and which usually is not zoned for this purpose. They also have another
common bond: they live in and struggle to break through. For example, to
acquire electricity, requires a communitary effort which ties them together and
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reflects the need for unity as reflected in the Colombian axiom: "the union
makes the force".
GOVERNMENT SPONSORED SETTLEMENTS
It is my hypothesis, government sponsored settlements, in contrast, have
no sense of community, and sometimes have problems developing it after the
settlement has been created. In this type of settlement, there is actually no
mayor reason to bring people together since there is no risk of eviction, or no
major problem that might serve as a bond between dwellers. People generally
do not know each other and they usually become friends only after some time.
They don't know each other because subsidies are so scarce that the
government does not grant them to people who share family ties, since they will
end up benefiting only a small number of families. Pedro Hernandez, current
owner of a house constructed by the government in barrio "San Pedro" and one
of the oldest dwellers, says that he has made friends with several of his
neighbors although many of them did not know each other before they moved to
their current dwellings. He says he knew many families which wanted to live
nearby but which were not granted a dwelling because, since they were scarce,
the government thought it unfair to give away subsidized houses to people who
shared family ties.
PIRATE SETTLEMENTS
It is my hypothesis pirate settlements usually have a sense of community
before the neighborhoods are settled since the people who buy the plots of land
usually know each other beforehand. They know each other because the most
common way of promoting pirate settlements is by the first-time buyers, who
bring along their friends and families, who end out buying plots in the same
project.27 Mr. Alvaro Huertas, member of the "Accion Comunal" of barrio 'La
Loma', a pirate settlement, says he knows almost everybody from the
neighborhood. He says that in all of the committees more than a 90% of the
settlers are often present; that there are no absentee tenants.
27lnterview Alvaro Huertas, Nov. 25, 1995.
"We don't have free rides, we know that if we are not close together
we won't be able to get the services we need. If someone is not
willing to help, we will all put pressure on this individual."
Besides, I believe the sense of community generated is often strong since
pirate settlers, as well as invasion settlers, also share a risk of eviction which
helps unite them.
CHAPTER TWO
HOW DID PIRATE SUB-DIVISIONS CAME INTO BEING?
The second chapter presents a more grounded and multi-dimensional view of
the evolution of informal settlements (invasions and pirate subdivisions). It
illuminates the history of how pirate settlements came into being.
The "struggle for earning a dwelling" can basically be divided into two
basic stages: an 'invasion' stage that peaked in the 1960's, and a 'pirate' stage
which followed, and which peaked in the 1970's.
1. INVASION STAGE
Colombia's housing problem has its roots in the colonial period where
large extensions of land, called 'ejidos', were donated by the king of Spain to the
government to be used for institutional purposes, such as the 'haciendas' El
Guabito, Las Salinas and San Joaquin. As time passed, these public properties
were converted into private ones due to the corruption of various municipal
authorities. As a consequence, the land was not equally divided among
residents, which accounts for today's existing inequality, and thus, for the large
number of people who to this date do not own a dwelling.
This serious housing problem, although several centuries old began to
erupt in 1912 when the first direct popular uprisings occurred in Cali. By 1942
and 1946, invasions were common. Many committees were formed to foster
this type of occupations, which generally took on the name of the plot of land that
was invaded, for example Colon and Villa Colombia.
These spontaneous invasions occurred more or less until 1946 when the
different committees realized they needed to band together to achieve better
results. The Federacion de Comites de Provivienda de Cali was thus, formed.
This organization unified all of the existing committees and literally changed the
'disorganized' house-seeking struggle into an 'organized' one, beginning to
resemble in this way the "organized" and planned system of developing projects
fostered by the formal sector.28
28Arango, Carlos. 1986. La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia. Bogota: Ediciones Ecoe.p.20.
By about 1959 the struggle moved to Bogota. The Federacion de
Comites de Provivienda de Cali wanted to change its name into Central
Provivienda de Colombia, to change from solely organizing movements in Cali,
to organizing them nationwide. This change in name, however, was hindered by
several disagreements, and this organization eventually called itself Central
Provivienda de Cundinamarca. (Later on, it changed its name to Central
Nacional Provivienda).29
Although this organization did not have a 'national' name, this did not stop
it from acquiring national prestige. Over time, the organization changed from
being led by intellectual and professional leaders who had originally organized
the group, into being managed by people who actually were struggling for
housing. This organization gave help and support to the invasion of 'Las
Colinas', neighborhood considered to be the first land taken over by an invasion
process in Bogota. This 'help' gave the organization nationwide prestige and
the support it needed to become nationally recognized.
Soon, it began helping to form other neighborhoods, including barrio
'Policarpa Salavarrieta' in southern Bogota. This invasion was far more
organized than 'Las Colinas", dwellings were planned and a small layout was
made. Invasions (informal sector developments), in this sense began to
resemble more the way in which government sponsored developments were
made (formal sector developments). For example, the dwellings, planned and
constructed before-hand, resembled small booths, so that noise coming from
the hammering would not be heard by governmental officials. (see Appendix
Two/1) 30 The different booths were setup in a general scheme where they were
numbered and set far enough apart from each other as to be unified, but
faraway enough so as to occupy the greatest extension of land (see Appendix
2/2). This system can actually be compared to the use of prefabricated dwellings
that is currently used for the construction of houses in the formal sector. This
neighborhood had a collective security system in which the settlers took turns
literally 'guarding' it from being seized by the authorities. An alarm system made
up of a rail and a rubber was set. It functioned in the following way: when a
29Arango, Carlos. 1986. La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia. Bogota: Ediciones Ecoe. p. 28.
30 Ibid. p.37.
noise was made, people from all of the dwellings were committed to coming in
mass to fight the aggressors. 31 This in a sense demonstrates the strong
community links that existed in this type of settlements. The government actually
tried seizing this settlement in June 19, 1962. In this "fight" many people were
injured and one man died; but dwellers heroically won the 'battle' by being able
to stay on this piece of land.
The struggle of the Policarpa Salavarieta neighborhood helped strengthen
the Central Nacional Provivienda which over time grew in experience and
maturity. In this conditions was that the Fifth National Assembly was convened
in August 1967, bringing together an assembly of 34 delegates of the different
invasion communities. Discussions centered on the official plans for providing
dwellings to the poor and about the different experiences of land occupations
fostered until this date. Organizations in different parts of the country with the
same objectives were formed. In November 1966, for example, in Villa del
Rosario in Norte del Santander, a new 'section' was formed. At the end of 1965,
a Centro Nacional Provivienda was also founded in Florencia, Caqueta.
Over time, the organization became more effective and thus, developed
and improved methods for conducting "the battle for a dwelling". With this in
mind a new way of leading the popular movement began to be fostered.
In 1971, residents and organizers occupied a populous neighborhood in
the land where barrio Nuevo Chile is currently located. The occupation of this
barrio was better planned than the ones in 'Las Colinas' and 'Policarpa', and was
carried out in a direct way, in contrast to the former ones, which were done
indirectly.32 In other words, this occupation was done in a "quasi-legal" way (I
use the term quasi-legal since the occupation was legal in the sense that the
dwellers had bought the land from its proprietors and thus, was theirs, however,
it was illegal because it violated the subdivision ordinance in the sense that it did
not furnish infrastructure and was subdivided in too many lots). Informal
settlements, thus, in a way became to resemble formal settlements as
occupations began to be done in land that was bought instead of being seized.
Later on, when the police came to evict the settlers they exhibited their
31Arango, Carlos. 1986. La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia. Bogota: Ediciones Ecoe. p. 45.321bid. p. 64.
documents of possession and their rent contracts. This, however, was not
enough, and they were eventually evicted and thrown in jail. When
governmental officials decided to grant them their liberty, they refused to leave
jail, arguing that they had no place to go.
The government soon understood that it needed to divise other methods
to counteract the force that these movements had gained. As a consequence, it
began working to divide them by participating in the 'juntas' of the barrios or
neighborhood committees. People from the government infiltrated in these
'juntas' in order to divide them. Government people, for example, began blaming
the Central Nacional Provivienda for the services they lacked and convincing the
people that they needed to follow government regulations if they wanted to own
a decent home. This strategy, however, did not produce major results because
the dwellers were able to see the government's "divide and conquer" intentions.33
In the 1970's experiences concerning the obtaining of services evolved.
In the case of the Nuevo Chile community, for example, it was not necessary to
get utilities from contraband. Neighborhoods from this settlement asked the
electric company to provide this service and asked the District Department of
Planning for topographic layouts. These two agencies agreed to help out since
they knew that if they did not comply, the settlers would eventually get what they
wanted by other means. They knew, from previous experiences in "Las Colinas"
and "Policarpa," that the settlers would eventually get the utilities by contraband
if they were reluctant to help them. 34 By this point in time thus, informal
settlements actually began to request for utilities in a very similar way as formal
settlements did.
The struggle for earning a dwelling in the 1970's not only extended
throughout the proletariat but to medium income sectors which suffered,
although not to the same extent as the former, who also could not afford a
dwelling. As a result, the Central Nacional Provivienda grew as masses of
middle-income people joined and began to commit time and ideas.
33Arango, Carlos. 1986. La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia. Bogota: Ediciones Ecoe. p. 66.
34 Ibid. p. 68.
As a result of this massive involvement new ways of developing
settlements were mapped out. Students of the best schools in Colombia,
including students from Los Andes, helped plan the layouts, resembling, thus, in
a way, the ones planned by the formal sector. These layouts were far more
developed than the previously ones. 35
Time later on April 8, 1971 the Sixth National Assembly met. For the first
time, previous experiences were compared to experiences from the different land
occupations. A list of points was made concerning the most important
principles, the need for discipline, collective help, of implementing various
strategies in order to house the poor. On this matter Carlos Arango in his book
"La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia" writes:
Habitation plans were made by the organization and developed by
the different dwellers' savings. 'These were personal savings with
collective criteria' as said Alvaro Rodriguez, former leader of the
Central Nacional Provivienda. The "Pablo Neruda" neighborhood
brought about the first experience in regard with this type of
settlement. With the savings of a group of people a piece of land
was bought. After the land was obtained the development of it
continued. For this particular settlement, the help of various
engineers and topographers was used to make the different
schemes and design the 'model house'.36
It is important to point out that informal settlements set out to resemble
formal ones. As seen in the previous quote, informal settlements began to
acquire land by buying it as formal sectors did. Also a 'one-design' house was
made to be plastered throughout the whole project, copying, in a way, the
uniform scheme used by formal settlements.
II. PIRATE SUB-DIVISION STAGE
By 1950, a new type of informal development grew: 'pirate sub-divisions'.
These settlements can be said to be the historical result of 'invasions'. As
35Arango, Carlos. 1986. La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia. Bogota: Ediciones Ecoe. p. 66.361bid. p. 69.
invasions grew in size, available plots of land became scarce, making land a
very valuable asset. Negotiating for it became a very lucrative business. This
circumstance, combined with governmental policies, fostered the creation of
pirate developments. This type of seizure became especially common in
Bogota. This type of settlements actually became to resemble even more formal
settlements since land, was now not invaded and taken for free, but rather sold
by intermediaries who subdivided it, ignoring any kind of government regulation.
This actually generated a land market which violated the subdivision ordinance
by not furnishing infrastructure and which often violated land-use plans as
settlements were located often in flood or hill-side areas. In the following
chapters the studies regarding the informal sector will center on pirate
subdivisions since these are in a way the result of invasions.
Settlements of this type became extremely popular as demonstrated by
the following accounts:
. According to Jorge Vernez, in 1970, 45% of the population lived in pirate
founded barrios in Bogota. This was equivalent to 204,182 of families living
in 'pirate barrios' over a total of 451,000 families.
. The 'Departamento the Accion Comunal' confirms that in Bogota, a new
satellite city of about 300,00 people grows every year. It also claims that
these cities create a new demand of about 70,000 new homes. From this
demand, government is able only to supply 15,000 homes. leaving the 55,000
remaining to the private sector. From this 55,000 the great majority
corresponds to "pirate" developers.37
. Almikar Hernandez, a noted Colombian reporter, found astonishing data in a
study made in one of the biggest neighborhoods of Bogota, which he later
published in the newspaper El Siglo. By 1977, he claimed there were
400,000 people living in 'pirate' settlements, more than half of the barrio's
total population. In that same year, according to official estimates, 230 of
Bogota's neighborhoods were 'pirate'.
37Arango, Carlos. 1986. La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia. Bogota: Ediciones Ecoe. p. 228.
36 ,
. Amparo Mantilla, a high ranking worker from the National Department of
Planning (Departamento Nacional de Planeacion), also confirmed in this
period of time that most of the east side of Bogota was settled by pirate
"barrios." The Administrative Department of the District Planning claimed that
between 1969 and 1985, low-income settlements had incorporated a total of
2480 hectares in Bogota. From this number a 56 percent corresponded to
"pirate settlements."38
. Recent studies indicate these numbers are increasing and that about 70
percent of all new housing does not follow government regulations.
Invasions, although existent, did not have the magnitude and importance of
pirate "barrios" in the most important cities, such as Bogota and Cali.
38Arango, Carlos. 1986. La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia. Bogota: Ediciones Ecoe. p. 228.
CHAPTER THREE
WHY DO "PIRATES" TAKE THE HOUSING BURDEN FROM THE
GOVERNMENT AND HANDLE THE PROBLEM THEMSELVES?
Chapter three deals specifically with the reasons behind the existence of pirate
developers. The main concept in this chapter is to prove that this "business" is
indeed economically and politically profitable.
Allan Caroll, who has held major research positions in the World Bank,
argues that pirates do not make abnormally high profits. However, according to
many other studies, pirates are in business because they indeed make large
profits. It is not my intention to disregard completely the findings done by Allan
Caroll but the way in which he conducted his study leaves serious doubts. It is
obvious to me that by asking and interviewing pirate developers these will
certainly lie about the real profits they make. Besides, if Allan Caroll's
assumptions are correct his findings do not invalidate the assumption that this
chapter makes: pirates, in general, perform illegal subdivisions in part for an
economic profit. Many pirates come from very poor families and what for some
people may not be an "abnormal high profit" for them might be the only way of
earning a living. These profits, small or big for our eyes, originate from an
extremely high demand for urban dwellings in the poorest sectors. "Pirates" are
born from this housing shortage and generate their profits from this situation.
I. ECONOMIC ASPECTS
A. LAND COSTS
The costs for pirate subdivisions are close to zero and are easy to finance
since organizations dedicated to this business usually sell land which generally:
1) does not belong to them but to somebody else which they trick giving them
only a down payment or sometimes nothing, while they sell it subdivided 2)
belongs to a landowner, profits are then split between the pirate and the
landowner 3) belongs to the government.39
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In reference to the way in which pirates acquire land Carlos Arango in his book
La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia says:
"Pirate urbanizers are known because in most cases they are not
the land owners. Almost always the land is owned by another
person, with the pirate urbanizer serving only as an intermediary
between the owner and the 'needy'. He starts his development only
with 'promesas de venta' (sale promises), and not with the real
papers that entitle him as being the land owner.40
This is the case of Vernabales, one of the owners of the 'Hacienda
Vernables'. He sold his rights to an urban pirate named "Alvaro Munoz" who
started construction and the sale of lots without having total rights over this
land. The pirate was not the owner because he had not even started paying for
the lot. Some time later, when the buyers' demanded proofs of purchase he told
them to speak with Arango Marino since he was the real proprietor of the land.
The victims of this swindle were 445 families which paid 4.781.361 pesos.41
It is not clear in this case if the owner of the land was actually working in
conjunction with the pirate developer, or if he was tricked as well as the families
which bought the lots.
A study done by the Administrative Department of National Planning says:
Most of the societies dedicated to this type of urbanization register
a process of "buy & sale". Land is usually bought with credit and
pirate urbanizers pay about 25% to 30% of its total price. In the
mean time they begin receiving money from the initial payment of
the subdivided lots from land buyers. They actually receive from
50% to 80% of the initial payment during the first six months. In
other cases, pirates start receiving initial payments by using
promises of sales without paying the initial down-payment of the
land that they subdivide. The basic characteristic of pirate
urbanizers is that they can start to develop with a minimum amount
of capital and sometimes with none. In most cases, the capital is
represented by the land which pirates have not paid and by money
40 Robledo, Jorge Enrique. 1985. El Drama de La Vivienda en Colombia y la Politica del "Si Se
Puede." Santa Fe de Bogota: El Ancora Editores. p. 52.41Arango E. Carlos. 1986. La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia. Santa Fe de Bogota: ECOE
Ediciones. p. 235.
which is not more than $100.000 (year 1973 value). Using this
investment, owners make about 4 to 6 million pesos which will
generally produce a profit ranging between 80% to 90% of the
investment.42
B. UTILITY COSTS
Pirate urbanizers usually do not provide any utilities in the neighborhoods
they develop. They usually have various mechanisms to help them bypass these
costs. An example of one of these mechanisms is a system of bribing owners of
the plots, so that they become part of the "accion comunal" (neighborhood
committee). Through these persons 'pirates' are able to ask the government for
utilities such as water and electricity, discharging their responsibility to the
government, to be paid with public funds.43
C. PLANNING COSTS
Usually pirate settlements involve some type of planning, at least to develop
simple layouts. The engineers, architects, and contractors needed to fulfill this
task usually get paid after the pirate has collected the money from the sale of
plots, or, in other cases, the 'pirate' may decide not to pay them. Gran Britalia,
one of the best-known 'pirate barrios' is one of many pirate developments where
the pirate did not pay his contractors:
In this "barrio" 3500 families were swindled by Clemente Chaves.
These properties were later seized by the engineer Roberto
Garcia Paz. This man argued that since he had not been paid by
Mr. Clemente Chavez the amount of 389.40 pesos, he had the right
to seize the properties until he received his payment.44
42Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Nacional. April 1973. El Mercadeo de Tierras en
Barrios Clandestinos de Bogota. Santa Fe de Bogota. p. 37.43Arango E. Carlos. 1986. La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia. Santa Fe de Bogota: ECOE
Ediciones. p. 56.
44Ibid. p. 232.
D. LEGAL COSTS
The costs involved in paper work, and the delays that this work is subject to
accounts for great financial loses. These costs are a price that settlements
which follow government regulations are subject to while pirate subdivisions, in
contrast, are not. Often the 'paper work' process (licenses, etc.) occurs after the
pirate settlement is developed, and costs are entirely paid by the government.
This is the case of the I.C.T. which, after controlling various pirate settlements,
ended giving out the settlements back to the pirates, totally legalized (the barios
declared to be legitimate) and with complete services (see Chapter Four for
details).
E. COMMISSION COSTS
Probably one of the most important costs that pirates are subject to are the
bribes public officials demand in order to 'help' or to leave the pirates do their
"job". However, most of the time, these bribes are paid after the job is already
done, leaving the pirates enough time to collect the necessary money. 45
F. ADVERTISING COSTS
Costs involved in advertising are also very small. Since the demand is so high
many plots are sold before the land is divided.
G. PROFITS
The price of pirate plots is usually high since these lots are actually at the
discretion of the "pirates" who sell the land at the highest price they can. Pirates
actually fix their prices and set the form of payment to extract the highest price
for each lot. This is in contrast to government sponsored settlements where a
45interview with Jose Miguel Alba, Planeacion Distrital, December 15, 1994.
standard, yet high price often exists. This availability to fix prices gives pirates
advantage because they are able to sell their plots to virtually the whole lower
range of the market.
The price of each square meter of land varies from lot to lot since the land is
generally not sold by meters but as a whole. The variations in price can be seen
in the same settlements, in lots sold the same day and sometimes in lots that are
next to each other.46  A table shown in the "El Mercadeo de Tierras
Clandestionos de Bogota" study done for the administrative planning department
of District Planning, serves to exemplify this issue. In this study three pirate
settlements in Bogota are shown with different prices (Appendix Three/1).
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
Various illustrative cases will be cited next as evidence of the profits 'pirate
developers' are able to make:
- "Atahualpa," a pirate development firm, buys the finca 'El Chital' in 1967.
This land is bought for 868,300 pesos payable in the following form:
July 1967 $200.000.
July 1968 $200.000.
July 1969 $200.000.
December 1969 $268.300.
with an interest of 16%.
This firm paid only the first payment in July of 1967 of $200.00., while raising
$1,746,907.74 from the sale of the lots. 47
46|nterview with Jose Miguel Alba, Planeacion Distrital, December 15, 1994.47Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Nacional. April 1973. El Mercadeo de Tierras en
Barrios Clandestinos de Bogota. Santa Fe de Bogota. Colombia. p. 60.
- Lozada Lora and Gomez Buendia presented the following case:
An owner of a plot of land bought for 56 cents each square meter
in 1964. In 1972, he sold it at a price of 15 pesos and 63 cents to
an urban pirate. Factoring in inflation for eight years between
payments, the real revenue for the land increased 416 percent.
The "pirate" urbanizer divided the land into plots and between 1971
and 1973 and he sold them at a price of $140 for each square
meter. It is very easy to deduce the high profit the pirate urbanizer
received from buying the squared meter of land at 15 pesos with 63
cents and later selling the same amount of land at $140 pesos.
- Another example of the high profits gained by "pirates" was highlighted by
Carlos Arango in his book La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia (The Struggle
for a Dwelling in Colombia):
Looking only at the neighborhood called Gran
Bretalia, Mr. Clemente Chavez swindled 3,500
families. He sold them plots of land of 200 meters
with services included, which eventually measured
only 122 meters and which had no services. He
bought the land for 9,600,000 pesos, paying the
owner only 3,000,000, leaving a mortgage of
6,000,000. Later on, in 1977, the land that he had
acquired had earned him a revenue of 80 million
pesos. With this he financed another settlement
called Gran Yomasa. From this settlement he
swindled 700 more families.48
- A study made by the Administrative Department of National Planning says
in reference to this aspect: "Pirate urbanizers usually get about an 80% to a
90% of profits in the business they handle."49
48Arango E. Carlos. 1986. La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia. Santa Fe de Bogota: ECOE
Ediciones. p. 232.49Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Nacional. April 1973. El Mercadeo de Tierras en
Barrios Clandestinos de Bogota. Santa Fe de Bogota. p. 37.
The study by Rodrigo Lozada Lora and Hernando Gomez Buendia in their
book, La Tierra en el Mercado Pirata de Bogota, illustrates how the net benefits
average 227% in five years for the particular settlements in their study (for more
details see Appendix Three/2).
- Blaesser's study of "El Diamante" shows settlement profits ranging from
82% to 163% (Appendix Three/3).
II. POWER
Economic aspects are not the only reasons why pirates decide to subdivide.
For many, sub-dividing settlements is a form of empowerment. Pirate
settlements actually move big masses of people, a strategy used by many to win
an election or a political job.50 Many pirate subdividers have become
"consejales" (councilors) or have occupied official jobs due to the support of the
various settlements they have created. Newspapers have not placed much
emphasis on pirate developers which seek for these profits, since various pirates
have high official jobs. However, many examples of political maneuvering are
known to exist in Colombian society. Probably the best example is Mr. Forero
Fetecua, who recently died. This man was known as one of the most important
pirate developers in Bogota and was 'consejal' and senator for many years. Last
year, he was put in prison because he was found with a large number of IDs
belonging to people from one of his settlements , seeking, obviously, to get re-
elected.
Respect and dependence might be other reasons why pirate developers
enter the business. Although it is difficult to measure, a desire for respect and
power may foster these kind of settlements. Pirates actually win the respect of
settlers if they are actually committed to the community. Many times people
regard pirates as the people who helped them and see their 'help' as the only
50interview with Jose Miguel Alba, Planeacion Distrital, December 15, 1994.
way of owning a house, a situation which obviously gives pirates a place in
society which in most cases they did not have before.51
51This is the case of Maria Bernal of barrio "La Loma" which actually defends, "Roberto" and
regards him as her friend.
CHAPTER FOUR
HOW HAS THE GOVERNMENT RESPONDED TO PIRATE SETTLEMENTS?
How has the government responded and what has been its role in changing this
pattern of behavior? This chapter presents a discussion on the basic responses
that the government has made through time to "combat" pirate subdivisions.
I. GOVERNMENTAL APPROACHES TO DEALING WITH PIRATE
SETTLEMENTS
The existence of informal settlements, specifically pirate developers, can
perhaps be explained by considering the government's weaknesses or support.
The discussion that follows will explore the government's response and its role
in "changing" the existence of pirate developments.
Governmental response should not be viewed from a single angle, since it
forms part of a multilateral process where various governmental sectors interact
and affect the way which policy gets made and later is enforced. Since
Colombia has a centralized government, legislation is made at the top level and
filtered through the system to the lower levels. Usually what happens is that
policy decisions made at the top level, get modified and end up working
differently when it reaches lower levels of government.
It seems from studies made on this regard that the central government
(the higher levels of the government), have had basically three approaches of
dealing with pirate settlements, the first two being direct actions and the third
being an indirect approach. In the first approach, pirate settlements are viewed
as harmful to society and must be weakened or eradicated by force. In the
second approach, the government is much more benevolent and believes
legalization (making existing settlements legitimate) is the solution to the
problem. The third approach centers on intervening indirectly by creating
measures that will force the "pirates" or developers to leave the market.
A. ERADICATION BY FORCE
In the first approach, eradication by the use of force, various habitants
from informal settlements are thrown out of their houses. Some examples are:
-"El Tiempo", the most important newspaper of Colombia, in its edition
July 27, 1990 edition told how several people from Ciudad Bolivar, a
neighborhood located in the southeastern part of Bogota, were thrown off of their
land:
...at two in the afternoon, Mayor Luis Contento Torres arrived at the
pirate settlement with 300 agents, four tanks, and two
helicopters.. 52
-On April 6, 1991, "El Espectador,"the second most important newspaper
in Colombia records:
...in only two and a half months they built 250 houses with
electricity and a water supply. Yesterday, the settlers were thrown
off of the land because they had invaded a piece of land that was
needed for the construction of Avenue Cundinamarca. About 100
policemen arrived at the site at eight o'clock in the morning with
their tanks and forced the 2360 inhabitants to flee from the area.
Many people tried to stop the police by using sticks and other
objects to defend the territory that they had bought for 200,000
pesos. While this happened new habitants were arriving and
pirates continued to sell their lots. Yesterday, for example, a pirate
was able to sell a lot of three by three meters for 500,000."s3
The "eradication" system instituted by the government changed as it
began to realize that the problem was much more complex and it needed other
types of solutions. As a result, a new way of dealing with the problem was
devised.
52E1 Tiempo. July 27, 1990." Desalojo en Ciudad Bolivar", Bogota, Colombia.
53E1 Espectador. April 6,1991. "Desalojados Invasores de la Futura Avenida Cundinamarca,"
Bogota, Colombia.
B. LEGALIZATION (meaning that the government declares existing
settlements legitimate)
The use of force to stop the spread of pirate subdivisions was not the only
way of dealing with the problem. Although some pirate settlements were
eventually stopped in the seventies the proliferation was so great and the police
and legislation forces so weak that the number of pirate neighborhoods settled
soon outpaced eradication efforts. As a result, a new approach was divised.
The government became more benevolent and instead of evicting and taking
over these settlements, it decided to legitimize them. The following discussion
clearly highlights this:
In 1968 the Colombian congress approved the Law 66. This law was
government's response to the numerous swindles made by pirate- owned firms
which sold extensive pieces of land in the trash dumps of Bogota to a
considerable number of people in the 1970's. This law actually authorized the
"Superintendencia Bancaria" to take action against the thieves. This
organization was given the power to intervene in all of the settlements which did
not fulfill the necessary requirements to be legal (in the sense that these
settlements violated the subdivision ordinance and land-use plans), by giving
them to the "Instituto de Credito Territorial". This institute, had to build the
appropriate sanitation, which included drainage, sewer systems, and electricity,
and guarantee the rights of those who had been affected by imposing the
necessary sanctions.
Following this law, by June of 1977, the Superintendencia had actually
intervened in 78 of the most popular settlements in Bogota, Cali, Barranquilla,
Bucaramanga, Manizales, Ibague and Cucuta. 54  The journalist Edgar
Artunduaga wrote in an article published by the local newspaper "El Siglo" on
April 15, 1981:
54Caballero, E. Enrique. 1986. Historia Economica de Colombia. Santa Fe de Bogota: Editorial
Oveja Negra. p.25.
... until this date the "Instituto de Credito Territorial" administered
88 of the "pirate-owned" businesses which owned 190 clandestine
settlements in Bogota...55
Although, this proves that some action was taken, in the long run, it had
no profound effects. It is true that some rights were given to the government to
take some action, in this case, the ICT (Instituto de Credito Territorial), but this
right was not backed up with the necessary resources or the financial support
that guaranteed the enforcement of their actions.
First of all, although the ICT seized a number of pirate-owned
organizations, this number was insignificant compared to the existing number of
pirate settlements. Secondly, the ICT was not structured to administer the
organizations it actually took over. Their administration proved to be more
inefficient than the services provided by pirate-owned organizations. The ICT did
not have the necessary budget to provide all of the services that the law
demanded. Due to all of these factors, it ended out, most often, returning the
administration of the settlements to the pirates, totally disregarding the law.
What the ICT actually did was the paper work. It made the settlements
licit (making existing settlements legal), giving them the necessary documents to
prove their legitimate existence, exempting them from taxes. This generally
proved very beneficial for the pirate organizations which were given back a totally
legitimate development cleared of all back taxes. In the other hand, the actual
settlers remained dissatisfied because the paper work was not as important to
them as the services they lacked.
Actual data show the limited reach of Law sixty-six. "The assets of 78
studied settlements in 1977 reached 932.8 million pesos, while the fine was
almost one million pesos."56 With regard to this subject Lozada Lora y Gomez
Buendia wrote:
It seems that the 'Superintendencia Bancaria' has adopted the
policy of avoiding as far as possible the imposition of sanctions,
55Arango E. Carlos. 1986. La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia. Santa Fe de Bogota: ECOE.
p.229.561bid. p. 229.
choosing a system of exhortations, communications, and 'friendly'
arrangements. In some cases this entity has proven to be
benevolent with certain 'pirate' organizations which repeated times
and for various years have broken the dispositions of the law."57
The process of legitimizing existing settlements is still being followed
although not in the same way that has been discussed. Currently various
programs are being created where public agencies do not 'seize' settlements
from pirate developers, but rather they work with the settlers to legitimize and
install utilities. This method of dealing with the problem is being combined with
the following approach.
C. INDIRECT APPROACH
The third kind of action the Colombian government uses against pirates is
an indirect approach to expel pirates from the market. Basically, the approach
forces the private sector to build the dwellings currently supplied by private
developers so that they are left out of the market. This theory assumes that as
pirates lose their demand for land and dwellings they will go out of business.
Since the government's process of eliminating pirate developments takes so
long, and is so inefficient, pirate developments continue to grow. The
government's inefficiency thus adds to the problem. In other words since the
results are measured in long-term effects, no immediate results are expected,
and this may be contributing to the high proliferation of this type of settlements.
The following examples illustrate different strategies that the government has
implemented following this policy:
-In the newspaper El Espectador there is an article published June 6,
1994 that makes reference to the creation of new licenses for construction called
'Bonos Verdes' or 'Green Bonds'. These licenses are mechanisms that permit
developers to enter the pirate market to 'end' this type of developments. The
idea is to permit the issue of construction licenses in Bogota for land that does
not have public utilities, with the agreement that the developers that use these
57Arango E. Carlos. 1986. La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia. Santa Fe de Bogota: ECOE. p.
230.
government bonds grant green spaces to the city and prepare the developments
for the installation of public utilities.[CD]
-Another approach is to create an agreement with the land owners of
eastern Bogota, between the Bogota River and the urban perimeter, being the
Tintal Zone for the first trial of this approach.58 The theory behind this approach
is to make land available to the private sector, to enable it, to compete with pirate
sector development. (See Appendix Four/1)
-Along the same lines, the government has created a scheme to give up
public sector land to decrease the price of land and thus make it more accessible
to poorer people. A newspaper article in El Espectador titled Con Tierra Bajaran
el Precio del Suelo reads:
In spite of the abuses made by land speculators, the Instituto
Nacional de la Reforma Urbana (Inurbe) will sell 14 million square
meters of land from 34 million they currently own. With this sale
the Institute wants to fight the high raise in the price of land that
continues in spiral in the principal cities of Colombia." 59
-The government has also tried increasing the availability of land for urban
purposes by expropriating unused land that is left a side for valorization.
-Another method devised by the government to halt pirate developments
is to grant permission to develop the borders of the city at a very low density,
creating a green belt along the city to protect these areas from being subdivided
by pirate developers. This method is intended to protect nature and the borders
of the city from conversion into high density urban centers. With respect to this
measure El Espectador in the May 26, 1992 edition reads:
With the belief of counteracting the formation of new 'pirate
developments' in the western mountains of the capital, the
58To give the necessary consistency to this approach, the Department of National
Planning made a special legislation: 'Special Treatment of Incorporation of the Suburban
Area of Expansion of Tintal Central'.
59E1 Espectador. date unknown. "Con Tierra Oficial Bajaran el Precio del Suelo", Santa Fe de
Bogota, Colombia.
government will grant permission for the construction of 4 to 8
houses for each hectare, with the provision that they will not violate
the norms for environmental protection. This will probably be the
only way of stopping urban growth, while guaranteeing the
existence of a green zone.60
Probably the most important method that has been developed to stop
pirate developments has been the creation of a system of subsidies by which the
government creates a bridge between the urban poor and private developers.
This approach replaces the supply of pirate dwellings for private ones. To do
this, the ICT (Instituto de Credito Territorial) was replaced by the Inurbe. By
doing this, the government created an entity in charge of granting subsidies to
the needy by directly giving subsidies to private-sector developers. By using
this method, the government aims to fill the gap between what the 'needy' are
able to pay and what the private developers are able to sell to earn a profit. (See
Appendix Four/2 for more details concerning this matter).
II. GOVERNMENTAL APPROACHES TO DEALING WITH PIRATE
DEVELOPERS
The governmental action outlined above mainly focused on the
settlements, while little or nothing was really done to the pirates themselves.
The benevolence of the government is demonstrated by Mr. Upegui in a case
that was tracked by investigators Lozada Lora and Gomez Buendia. In it, they
present an example of the government's lenience with one of these
organizations:
By September, 1969 the 'pirate' organization ordered to suspend
the advertisement concerning the sale of plots, an order which was
completely ignored. By 1970, the "Superbancaria" notified the
organization to make a renewal of their registration which had
already expired. It also ordered it to present detailed explanations
concerning the complains of several people who had actually been
affected with their procedure. The owners of this organization once
more ignored the government's notifications. By May of 1971, the
"Superbancaria", after the violations of Law 66 of 1968, decided
60E1 Espectador. May 26,1992. "Amplian Cota Urbanistica para Proteger los Cerros." Santa Fe de
Bogota, Colombia.
to fine the organization with 25,000 pesos, a small amount
compared to the profits that this organization had received. Having
complete knowledge of their conduct, the government renewed
their construction license for two consecutive years (Resolution
2846 of 1972 and Resolution 1214 of 1973). Three months after
this last renewal the 'pirate' organization was finally given to the
"Instituto de Credito Territorial" for its administration (Resolution
2055 and 2076 of 1973).61
According to Mr. Upegui, by this point in time the 'pirate
organization' had already constructed more than ten urban
settlements, had stolen millions of pesos, and had bribed many
public officials of the "Superbancaria" and other public
organizations. The data reflect that this organization broke the law
for four consecutive years with the consent of the government.
The government, however, had some responses, although mainly due to
pressure from community groups. The "Central Nacional Provivienda" is one of
the institutions that proved to be important in organizing the community against
'pirate' organizations, while government proved to be negligent. The pirate
communities saw the importance of organizing groups for the defense of their
rights. They understood that making individual claims was not a workable
solution. Many debates were held between Mario Upegui, leader of the "Central
Nacional Provivienda", and Congress in the 1970's. Mr. Upegui denounced
several cases which not only involved the immorality of the so-called 'pirates', but
the corruption of several governmental officials. He actually won the
government's intervention in settlements such as: Gran Britalia, Gran Yomasa, El
Portal, Villa Gladys and Bahia Solano. Many of the deceived people gained
back their money, and the 'pirates' were not only fined but, some were actually
thrown in jail for a year.62 The press also played an important role in denouncing
several organizations which did not follow governmental regulations, demanding
the government's intervention. Newspapers helped spread information
concerning the "new" laws (Law 66) so that people would know them and
support their application.
61Muri\\o C. Gabriel and Ungar B. Elizabeth. Politica Vivienda Popular y el Proceso de Toma de
Decisiones en los Paises de Desarrollo, Santa Fe de Bogota, Centro de Investigaciones para el
Desarollo. p. 25.
62Robledo, Jorge Enrique. 1985. El Drama de la Vivienda en Colombia. Santa Fe de Bogota: El
Ancora Editores. p. 26.
In various cases that followed, community pressure proved to be a useful
weapon against pirate action. In one of these cases, for example, Jorge Salazar
Herrera, one of the urban "pirates" was actually thrown in jail although not for
very long (1 year). Many of the 'pirate' organizations were actually inspected due
to the struggle of millions of families who had been tricked by these
organizations. El Espectador on November 17, of 1992 states:
For, about eight years, the lake of Santa Maria was invaded by
pirate subdividers, who were polluting this ecological resource. In
the last year, neighbors started to see how these settlements grew
as various houses were constructed along the river. The
community and the members of the Junta de Accion Local, in
response, started organizing meetings to stop the 'pirates' from
ruining this ecological reserve. Finally this Wednesday they were
able to see the results. In a symbolic act, the lake of Santa Maria
was returned to the community."63
In another case, the Procuraduria General de la Nacion asked for the
suspension of Rembertio Torres, a governmental official, because he had
permitted the occupation and the sale of lots to two pirate developers near El
Dorado International Airport. The owners of this lot pressured the government
which was eventually forced to intervene.64
In conclusion, although the central Colombian government seems to make
efforts to halt pirate developments, their actions have not been strong enough. It
is not clear if the government is really interested in stopping them. In most
cases actions taken are directed at settlements and not at pirates. In addition it
seems that government has intervened when it has been forced to do so, and
not in each and every settlement. The government intervenes usually because
the pirate land is needed for some reason or because community pressure is too
strong to disregard it. The central government itself says it is against pirate
developments and has passed several pieces of legislation opposing these
developments, however, they may be too lenient, or perhaps not based in reality,
63E1 Espectador. November 17, 1992. "Devuelven Laguna de Santa Maria a la Comunidad,"
Santa Fe de Bogota, Colombia.64E1 Espectador. September 26,1991. "Suspension por Treinta Dias a Personero Delegado en lo
Policivo." Santa Fe de Bogota, Colombia.
since they have had no profound effects. The truth is that the central
government's plans and policies have not been carried out. Whatever the case,
this long list of evidence demonstrates that the government has not been able to
fight pirate subdividers adequately. Pirate settlements are increasing and in a
way the government has come to accept and deal with them.
CHAPTER FIVE
WHY DOES THE GOVERNMENT "PERMIT" PIRATE SETTLEMENTS?
An increase of pirate settlements can only be explained by considering the
government's support of them or government's inability to eradicate them. This
chapter explores the governments' reliance on 'negative' attitudes toward pirate
developments by hypothesizing from empirical material why this behavior occurs.
The theories discussed in this chapter are formulated by this author.
According to Paul Baross and Jan Van Der Linden, pirate settlements
flourish only in beneficial circumstances provided by the government: "SCRS
(name given to "pirate" organizations) do not develop in a policy vacuum,
explicitly or implicitly governments are highly involved in their creation, spread,
and evident permanency." 65 From this point of view three basic theories that can
help explain the existence of pirate settlements. The first theory focuses on how
these settlements benefit the government and the country as a whole. Although
the government has tried, as proven before, to combat them to a certain degree,
the theory believes that the government allows them to exist and probably
protects them because these settlements actually benefit the government.
Another theory holds that certain sectors of government benefit from them and
although the central government might be interested in stopping pirate
settlements, these sectors actually help pirate settlements survive. A third theory
holds that pirate settlements do not benefit any sector of government but that
they exist because they are too powerful to fight.
Proving that one of these three theories is completely right or completely
wrong would be too difficult since the reasons that they exist may not involve a
single theory but probably two or three. Besides, there is not enough evidence
concerning this matter and perhaps it is too difficult to find. The study that will
follow will be concerned with the probable reasons that underlay these three
theories, so that the reader understands the connection and the importance of
each of them and may freely choose to believe in the theory(ies) that sound
most convincing.
65Baross, P. Linden Cedst. 1990. The Transformation of Land Supply Systems in Third World
Countries. Brookfield, Vermont: Avebury Publishing. p. 25.
I. THEORY I: PIRATE SETTLEMENTS BENEFIT GOVERNMENT, THUS
THEY EXIST
The underlying assumption of this theory is that the government has
ignored or at least let pirate settlements survive because they actually provide
considerable benefits from an institutional, economic and political point of view.
A. INSTITUTIONAL BENEFITS
The Colombian government, as a whole, has had basically three methods
of finding a solution for housing the poor: developing housing projects, allowing
the private sector to develop them, or allowing the 'pirate' sector and other
sectors which do not comply with legal regulations (those regulations which
follow the subdivision ordinance and the land-use plans) to develop them.
The government has indeed tried to develop several housing projects, but
most of them have failed. Many of them have remained unfinished, while others
have cost considerable amounts of money that the government has not been
able to recover.
If seen in detail, the mechanisms to develop public housing projects are
cumbersome and time consuming:
For example, in order to provide a "housing plan", the government
has to seek the necessary money. To do this, it has to develop
many plans and programs to get a final approval. After approval,
many long studies are required to figure out the appropriate project
and a suitable way of handling the program. This translates into
opportunism and bureaucratic procedures which often delay the
process, causing money loses. The government later needs to
hire an increased number of personnel. This means more money
and more organizational mechanisms for the management of this
'extra' personnel. The process also implies hiring many
contractors, who often bribe governmental officials to gain
contracts, weakening the system and corrupting government.
Dealing with all of these contractors, engineers, architects, etc.
results in extra time and many other problems. Some contractors,
for example, do not complete their job correctly and the
government is forced to seek new ones to replace them
immediately, often paying them more than the fair value. Later on,
the government must collect the money from the settlers. This
money, most of the time, is lost because there is no official
organization with the necessary mechanisms to collect it. At the
end, the government loses a considerable amount of money and is
left with a dissatisfied community that without having paid for
service, protests for the lack of services and the "malfunctioning"
of houses. An example is the neighborhoods of Pubenza
constructed by the ICT:
What happened with Pubenza is that they are overwhelmed with
great structural and constructive failures. If houses of one to two
centuries ago don't have failures, it is hard to explain why
settlements constructed five years ago are having so many
problems. 66
The government has recognized in some way that it is institutionally
incapable of handling these type of projects and is currently trying to work with
the private sector to help it take charge of developing housing projects. The
magazine Sintesis Economica in its October 15, 1990 edition says:
Although the most recent governments have demonstrated their
interest in offering massive dwellings for the poor, none of the
programs have functioned. The experts did not have to think too
much to conclude that it is important to reach the objective without
a monetary subsidy. The formula of the 'builder' state definitely did
not function.67
Currently a system of subsidies handled by Inurbe has been instituted to
make private developments accessible to the poor. Although the plan in general
terms probably is working, it is definitely not targeting the lower sector of the
lower class which is still left with 'pirate subdividers' as the only option when
seeking a dwelling (refer to Appendix Four/2 for more details). In reference to
this aspect El Espectador in the April 3, 1991 edition says:
66Robledo, Jorge Enrique. 1985. El Drama de la Vivienda en Colombia y la Politica del "Si Se
Puede". 1985. Santa Fe de Bogota: El Ancora Editores. p. 26.67Sintesis Economica. Octubre 15, 1990. Delegar o Desentenderse. Santa Fe de Bogota. p. 25.
In order to qualify for a subsidy, the poor families of Colombia
have to have a savings account and must be able to pay a 5%
down-payment for the dwelling. This means that if someone wants
to acquire a five million pesos dwelling he must pay 250,000 pesos.
If he has less, he does not qualify for governmental aid.6 8
By allowing pirate organizations to function, the gap between the people that
do not have access to private sector development is filled, while the government
actually saves time and money by not developing low-income housing projects.
Pirate organizations, most of the time, are in charge of organizing settlements
with all of the difficulties this entails. If the government decides to intervene in a
certain "pirate barrio", it is left with an "organized" neighborhood in which the
only thing it needs to provide is services. By using the "pirate" system, the
government does not only get rid of all the difficulties that this process involves,
but reduces the institutional work of developing a project. As Linden and Baross
point out, "Moreover, the government does not become involved in the delicate
controversies that develop regarding the distribution of land, the quality of the
terrain, and the prices charged by speculators. In addition, since it assumes no
responsibility for the 'barrio's' existence, it is not committed to provide community
improvements immediately."69
B. ECONOMIC BENEFITS
From an economic point of view, settlements developed by the government
demand a considerable amount of money. Due to the lack of administration and
institutional difficulties, the government can lose large quantities of money.
Besides, these dwellings, most of the time are totally paid by the government
instead of being subsidized partially since the settlers almost never pay back
their loans.
6 8EI Espectador, April 3,1991, "Los Mas Pobres Se Quedan Sin Piso."69Baross, P. Linden Cedst., 1990. The Transformation of Land Supply Systems in Third World
Countries, Avebury Publishing: Brookfield Vermont. p. 28.
By leaving the development to private companies, the amount of money
spent by the government per dwelling is greatly reduced. The money spent at
least is accounted for and amounts to a subsidy, and not the total amount of the
house which occurs with dwellings developed by the government. Once again,
the problem with government settlements is that they do not provide a solution
for the most needy.
Pirate settlements, in contrast, offer the poorer sector of Colombia's lower
class a place to live in. These neighborhoods actually cost, in most cases, much
less than what government sponsored developments cost the government.
According to Baross and Linden "an invasion costs the government nothing,
except the price of the land itself".70 Pirate settlements actually do not cost to
the government anything in the first stages except the price of the land when it
does not belong to the pirate developer but to an official entity. The costs do
arise for the government when public utilities are constructed. Although the cost
of providing utilities is much more expensive in pirate settlements than in
government sponsored settlements, the cost of the whole dwelling is much less.
Pirate settlements are made by the same dwellers, using materials they are
able to afford and thus the cost is not totally born by the government as
generally occurs with government sponsored settlements.
C. POLITICAL BENEFITS
In Colombia, political stability plays a very major role in decision making.
Being a Third World country, stability is somewhat fragile, and the country is in
no position to "afford" having a revolution. "Pirate settlements" prove beneficial
because they not only remove all of the burdens associated with the process, but
they actually house a great number of people, which in turn decreases
dissatisfaction, and lowers the risk of any possible political uprising. In a certain
way 'pirate settlements' can be regarded as "escape valves".
70Baross, P. Linden Cedst., 1990. The Transformation of Land Supply Systems in Third World
Countries, Avebury Publishing: Brookfield Vermont. p. 28.
Besides, if pirates do not fulfill their 'job' correctly and the government
decides to interfere, no matter what their action is, if it provides any kind of
service, the government will stand in a very different position than when it
develops projects. By helping out, in this circumstance, the government is
usually regarded favorably by the residents of the sector, while all the blame is
passed on to the pirate developer. The government thus is left with no
responsibility concerning the "barrios" existence, and does not have to provide
immediate services to the community involved.
Government sponsored 'barrios' in the contrary, blame the government for all
the problems they face. For them, the provision of services is a duty that the
government must perform. When government sponsored settlements are
constructed, settlers feel the government actually owes them a dwelling along
with services such as water, electricity and sewage. When public utilities are
not installed, settlers blame the government and political strife usually ensues.
It is true that the Colombian government receives some benefits from pirate
settlements but it is unclear if this is the reason why they allow them to exist.
According to various officials and residents interviewed it seems clear that the
government officially does not see pirate settlements as useful, but rather prefers
to blame pirates for the situation. Having this on mind, if the government allows
these settlements exist, it is probably not doing it so deliberately.
II. THEORY 11: PIRATE SETTLEMENTS BENEFIT CERTAIN
GOVERNMENTAL SECTORS, THUS THEY EXIST
The underlying assumption here is that certain sectors of government benefit
from the existence of pirate settlements either, institutionally, politically, or
economically.
Foremost, although the central government's action may be centered on
completing pirate developments, this idea changes as it filters through different
governmental levels. In some instances even top-level officials of traditional
parties favor pirate developments.
Mayor Bernando Gaitan Maecha, for example, in 1978 pronounced that
he favored legitimizing pirate developments. He claimed that the construction of
settlements which violated the subdivision ordinance (having too small lots and
not offering utilities) should actually be authorized by the government without
following the legal requirements of Law 66 of 1968. He argued that this measure
would end with many of the urban invasion settlements created by the needy in
Colombia. Others claimed that the government's plan concerning housing was
developed to favor and, indeed, to stimulate pirate settlements because it
provided the "pirates" an opportunity for doing good business, allowing them to
become legitimate later on with a minimum number of requirements stipulated
by Law 66.
Even ex-president of Colombia, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, when he was
Councilor of Bogota, opposed the assistance of various government officials in
taking part in debates concerning these issues. For example, he was against the
investigation of Sergio Arboleda Casas, former director of "Planeacion Distrital",
who was asked to respond to the actions of the institution he directed concerning
the several denouncements made against Clemente Chaves, a recognized
"pirate".
A. INSTITUTIONAL BENEFITS
Institutionally there are various organizations with a large sector of employees
devoted to legitimizing pirate settlements. In Planeacion Distrital there are, for
example, about 15 employees only working on matters concerning legalization
(making existing settlements legitimate). Although the institution, in itself would
probably be better off if it was not concerned with this matters, the truth is that
various employees fear they would lose their jobs if legalization (legitimize
existing neighborhoods) was not a mandatory task for the institution. According
to a small survey that was taken in District Planning 7 out of 10 feared that they
would probably not be working in this institution if legalization was not part of
their duties (see Appendix Five/1 for details). The institution, however, would
probably be better off if it did not have to deal with these concerns. Since it
devotes a large amount of time dealing with pirate and other informal
settlements, their time would be better spent if devoted to other important
concerns such as planning and designing.
B. ECONOMIC BENEFITS
From an economic point of view, many sectors both private and public
benefit from pirate settlements. Pirate settlements actually form part of a rather
large business in which many people profit. Usually pirate developers bribe
governmental officials to extract information and to be granted 'permission' to sell
the land or develop their projects. Many officials actually make a living from this
money since the salaries that they get paid are usually very low. In a couple of
interviews officials actually admitted that they were bribed. One admitted that
just a week ago (December 10, 1995) he was bribed with 3 million pesos (about
3,750 dollars) if he kept secret the existence of a pirate settlement that was
about to be formed.
In the public sector, for people not working for the government, pirate
settlements have grown into large enterprises which provide jobs for many
people. Since the number of pirate developments is so large, people are
employed in the planning process, and with the sale of the lots, etc.
C. POLITICAL BENEFITS
Many pirate settlements are developed because of political reasons.
Many pirates have actually had high-ranking jobs in the government. A clear
example is Mr. Forero Fetecua, who was councilor of Bogota for many years.
Pirate settlements actually create a very interesting mechanism by which they
are used as a means of political support, as is the case of barrio "Diana
Quintero." This neighborhood, located in southern Bogota, was sponsored, by
the former mayor of the city, Hernando Duran Dussan. Many people claim that
Mr. Duran Dussan, using one of his political lieutenants (Alfredo Guerrero
Estrada), actually helped organize the neighborhood for electoral reasons.
Ignoring several claims made by the Departamento Nacional de Planeacion
(National Department of Planning), the district and national administration, at that
time headed by Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala (later president of Colombia and father
of Diana Turbay), granted electricity, water and other services to the
neighborhood. Even the Registraduria del Departamento Civil (national registrar)
helped by moving the electoral booth # 260 from where it was (in Barrio San
Agustin), to the cooperative belonging to the neighborhood. It is important to
note that the votes deposited in this booth were decisive in the election of Mr.
Guerrero Estrada to the council of Bogota.71
Soon later, in a debate in the Council of Bogota concerning the
neighborhood "Diana Quintero," Mr. Rodrigo Vargas, another member of the
council said: "The residents of the lots in the neighborhood called "Diana
Quintero" are totally deserted by the estate, and are subject to a system of fear
and blackmail carried out by Mr. Guerrero Estrada." Rodrigo Vargas, also said
that same night that Mr. Guerrero Estrada had actually used official forms with
the titles of "Planeacion Distrital" (District Planning) and other official entities,
faking approval permits for this neighborhood. These "faked" letters approved
the 'pirate barrio' and authorized the supply of all services. By this action Mr.
Estrada actually increased the price of the plots from 30,000 pesos to 100,000 in
only a few days. Mr. Vargas also mentions that a number of people claimed
that Mr. Estrada had actually threatened to expel them from the neighborhood if
they did not vote for his Council lists in Bogota.72
This example demonstrates the political importance that these settlements
have on people who want to get elected to public office. Many of the people who
seek a job in this way eventually get elected to high ranking public positions.
After being there, they are obviously not going to oppose pirate developments
since they know they can eventually use this mechanism to get elected again.
It is indeed true that many sectors of the government benefit from pirate
settlements and thus contribute to their existence. What is unclear is whether
this circumstance is the sole reason for the existence of pirate developments.
71Arango E. Carlos. 1986. La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia. Santa Fe de Bogota: ECOE. p.
239.72Ibid. p. 239.
Ill. THEORY Ill: PIRATE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE BECOME SO
POWERFUL THAT GOVERNMENT CAN NOT CONTROL THEM
During the past two decades, pirate settlements have proliferated and they
have become quite powerful. Actually they have become necessary dwelling
suppliers since they target a sector, (the poorest class), which has currently no
competition. Many factors have influenced the strength and power that pirate
developments now hold.
A primary factor has been the city's rapid growth together with income and
municipal policies that govern urban growth and development. The distribution
of income among households has actually determined the extent to which
municipal and housing standards can be sustained, causing a mismatch
between housing prices and housing incomes. On respect to this issue
Mackenzie writes:
...More than 80% of the people are in the low-income stratum and
about 8% in the high income stratum in Bogota."73
This factor has actually created a demand which is not supplied by the
formal sector but by the informal one. 74
A second factor which probably helped strengthen pirate subdividers is
the relatively high rate of return on their developments. This actually draws more
people into this business, while making the ones that are already in the business
wealthy.
In conclusion, it can be said that pirate settlements are linked in one
way or another to the way government has handled the housing situation.
If these settlements exist it is because the legislature has permitted their
survival. What it is not yet clear is the underlying reasons why the
government allows the existence of pirate settlements. This part of the
73Mackenzie, James Russel. 1987. The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Alternatives in the
Context of Rapid Urban Growth: A Case Study of Bogota. Boston: UMI. p. 42.
74Orville F. Grimes, Jr. 1976. Housing for Low Income Urban Families. IBRD Research
Publication. John Hopkins Press. p. 10.
study is based in the belief that certainly some benefits or governmental
weaknesses must account for this situation. The three theories presented
explore the benefits and the weaknesses. It is to the reader to decide which
theory makes the most sense.
CHAPTER SIX
IF PIRATE SETTLEMENTS GENERATE SOLID PROFITS, WHY DOESN'T
GOVERNMENT MIMIC THEM?
This chapter aims to explain why the formal sector has not been able to act like
the informal sector. This chapter asks why the government has not been able to
successfully mimic pirate developments.
I. GOVERNMENT'S SHIFT TO RESEMBLE INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS
It is my hypothesis that the Colombian government has been changing its
strategy to develop housing settlements over the past decade: as their new
strategy (consciously or unconsciously) seems to be closely resembling pirate
settlements in various of the characteristics set forth in Chapter One where the
"first" settlements developed by both the formal and informal sector were
explored. This can be seen in the following aspects:
A. ADAPTABILITY TO THE CHANGING NEEDS OF INDIVIDUAL
HOUSEHOLDS
Many governmental settlements have been designed to provide the
flexibility that the informal sector provides, where settlers are able to have input
into the design of their house by using temporary materials which allow them to
easily make changes. The government's first attempt at designing flexibility was
to provide projects with two and three design alternatives rather than the single
design complexes they had been building where every home was identical. The
multi-design options gave the settlers at least some degree of decision making.
Later on, the government began offering site & service projects in which only the
lot was provided to the dweller so that he could design his/her own house.
Currently, the majority of government projects are focused on working with the
private sector to provide a wider range of options (Refer to Appendix Four/2).
B. AFFORDABILITY AND COST PHASING OVER TIME
The government has founded various studies to explore different
alternatives provided by pirates so that it can develop similar approaches. The
government has looked at ways that pirate developments can work in a "legal"
environment (meaning one which complies with government regulations),
studying, for example, their profitability if the pirates provided utilities. A 1973
document by the Department of National Planning reads:
The greatest problem for low-income families is the monthly
pressure to pay the rent. These families need a plot of land so that
they can build their dwelling, which at first might be a temporary
one, but will eventually be replaced by a permanent dwelling. This
way of dealing with the problem might serve to combat the dwelling
deficit, while competing with pirate urbanizers. It is important to
know how the land market works in this type of urbanization and
thus, studies dealing with this topic should be made.75
The government made various attempts to construct pirate-like
developments accessible to low income budgets. 'Normas Minimas' (Minimum
Standards) is a policy installed by the government which enabled settlements to
be formed, complying with minimum standards of development. The
government thought that with minimum building standards required, costs
would be drastically lower, permitting low-income families to purchase dwellings.
The problem with instituting these settlements according to Caroll's
findings were basically four: First, potential developers of normas minimas may
be deterred by lack of access to the necessary capital to install required
infrastructure. Second, supply of land of normas minimas may be limited by
zoning laws. Third is that the process of the approval is characterized by delays.
Four, it is a social image problem.
75Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Nacional. April, 1973. El Mercadeo de Tierras en
Barrios Clandestinos de Bogota, Santa Fe de Bogota. p. 76.
C. OPTIMAL PROVISION OF SERVICES FOR DWELLERS
Government projects have shifted from providing projects with all services
included (water, sewage, electricity), to the provision of alternatives with limited
services, in this way resembling informal sector developments. These limited-
service settlements are better described by Mackenzie:
"The recipient obtains an individual lot within a subdivision in which
the site will be provided within a street layout. Almost always site is
unpaved, with open-ditch surface drainage and aerial electrical
service. The site might contain communal water wells or each
individual lot might be supplied with a well. Sewage lines are
usually not provided, although the alternate, a septic tank would
be."
D. SENSE OF COMMUNITY CREATED BY THE
SETTLEMENT PROCESS
Government projects have been striving to 'recreate' the sense of
community the informal sector developments have. Many projects resulted from
a joint venture between the community, so that the unity created in building
homes creates the 'sense of community' found in informal developments.
Following this plan, the government has developed self-help & mutual-help
developments. These two types of developments are based on procedures by
which the potential dweller becomes part of the effort to build the development.
The main difference between the two is that in 'self-help' developments, each
family provides their own labor for their own dwelling, while 'mutual-help'
developments result from group efforts in which everyone participates in the
building of all of the dwellings.
Project building, however, has not been the only method of building
community. Due to the "extra costs" (use of labor which is not trained often
accounts for loses in material and project delays), the government has shifted
from supporting community-constructed projects to ones which bring the
community together in other communal forms such as working groups that
strategize what, how and where they build.
It is clear to me that the government has indeed shifted its policies to
provide housing for the poor in a way similar to the informal market. The results,
to date, however, indicate that programs of this type have not been entirely
successful and that the housing shortage still exists. What is wrong? What do
informal settlements provide that the government has not been able to mimic?
Why hasn't government been able to build low-income housing in the same
way? The following discussion is the author's explanation of the reasons behind
why all of these attempts have failed.
II. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE LEGAL SECTOR AND PIRATE
SUBDIVISIONS
A. BREADTH
The government is disabled to work in the same way as pirate
organizations do because their objectives are different. While the government
has extremely broad interests, pirates usually have very clear and narrow
objectives. The goal of the government is housing the urban poor, an extremely
broad and demanding objective. Pirate urbanizers have, very focused
objectives: to extract a certain amount of money or political support from a
particular settlement. Success, in this sense, can be measured very rapidly and
accurately. The different way of defining objectives and of assessing success
between government and pirates might actually be a large drawback which limits
the government of performing in the same way as pirate settlements do.
B. DUALITY OF OBJECTIVES
Objectives do not only differ in their breadth but in their purpose. The
central government has a dual set of objectives which are often contradictory;
pirate settlements, in contrast, has one objective which works to streamline the
development process.
The government is actually seeking not only to house the poor, but to
provide a social benefit and not in any way generate profits from "poor" people.
The problem comes about when this theoretical aim is put into action. The reality
is that entities working to developing low-income dwellings need refinancing, and
must cover at least their expenses to continue to exist. In regard to this
Mackenzie says:
A C.P.V. (Caja Popular de Vivienda) spokesman recognized that
the attempt to keep the agency financially viable makes it difficult to
meet the needs of the low-income population in Bogota.76
In other words, the government must commit considerable amounts of
money and resources to the plan, money which often can not afford to invest or
can not properly manage. The government's objectives, although devoted to
help, actually are unrealistic. The result is that most of the institutions and
programs created by the government for this purpose have gone broke. This is
the case of various institutions as is demonstrated in a Department of National
Planning study:
The financial organisms of public dwellings have become de
capitalized, and are thus, unable to continue to effectively handle
the work."77
Pirate urbanizers, by contrast, usually have a clear set of objectives
which fuels each step of the work that must be done. For example, the pirate
urbanizer's main objective is to earn a profit and secure a governmental position.
These objectives are complementary because as the pirate turns a profit, this
profit is then generally used in the campaign.
76Mackenzie, James Russel. 1987. The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Alternatives in the
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C. DIFFERENCE IN SIZE
Another difference that inhibits government's ability to work in the same
way as pirate urbanizers is the size of the bureaucracy they have to move to
obtain their objectives. Governmental structure is usually too big and
complicated to be able to handle projects in the same way as pirate urbanizers
work. It can be said that government works in a macro environment while pirate
urbanizers work in a micro one. The general process of a project clearly
exemplify these differences:
When government invests in a housing plan it usually has an
institution which manages the program, such as the Caja de
Vivienda Popular, Inurbe, etc. This institution has to manage the
program and must work in most cases with a severely constrained
budget. Usually start-up funds for the project are considerably
delayed. This makes the initial budget assigned insufficient to
covering the initial expenses. As time passes, inflation increases;
rising the cost of the project. This process goes on and on, leaving
the project often times unfinished. The governmental institution
that administers the program is very much dependent on other
institutions and lacks of the autonomy that "pirate organizations"
have. Actually these institutions are only a branch of a larger
governmental structure which is very often filled with beurocracy
and corruption. Many times these institutions must rely upon other
institutions to correct mistakes or change strategies, a process
which is generally linked with paperwork and delays which result in
more investment and less efficiency. These institutions generally
do not have the mechanisms to perform certain procedures. For
example, it is often difficult for them to assign contracts to carry out
the different projects, since they are subject to so many bribes. As
a consequence, the government usually ends up paying a
considerable amount of money which can usually be bought for
less in the open market.
"Pirate organizations" on the other hand, are much smaller and able to
function much better than the government can in many circumstances. Usually
there is agreement between the budget and the actual costs related to the
development of the project. This means that the budget generally matches the
costs of the project and this means that the project gets finished, at least until
the stage that the pirate desires (often without utilities.) Problems related to
liquidity are usually solved by the "pirate" who usually possesses the
mechanisms to borrow the necessary cash. Also, pirate organizations do not
encounter the hazards of relying on other institutions to finance them or to be
able to change and adapt to different situations as public institutions do.
Problems are usually rapidly detected by the owner or "pirate" who has the ability
to problem solve immediately.
D. DIFFERENCE IN INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Governmental and pirate organizations are structured differently. While
the ultimate responsibility of pirate organizations rests with the owner, the
responsibility of pirate organizations rests with an employee. This difference,
although seemingly small, actually completely changes the way these two
organizations work.
In pirate organizations, the pirate or manager sets clear goals which are
obviously the same: economic or political profit. In other words, if the pirate
organization does well, the pirate also does well.
Public institutions have dissimilar goals since the person in charge usually
has slightly different goals than the institution's. Governmental employees are
appointed to manage an institution and have personal goals that might be to
obtain economic profits, political support, etc., which not necessarily coincide
with the goals of a public housing project. In other words, a project's success
does not necessarily mean success to the employee. This contradiction is
actually the cause of the failure of many governmental projects where
managers or directors have not been completely committed to the fulfillment of
their job.
There has been attempts to tie project objectives to managers' objectives
by increasing their salaries or advancing their positions but these strategies have
not proved to be entirely successful.
The reason for success can often be measured only over large time
spans since it takes a long time to know how successful different types of
settlements have been. This means that salaries raise due to good performance
will only come about after "project directors" or "managers" have already left
their positions. Attempting to measure projects in relation to their immediate
performance creates problems because cheaply made developments often end
up collapsing because they are not constructed to last (bad quality of materials,
bad administration, etc.). Though developments may function well the first two
years or so, bringing praise to project managers, they often fall apart in the long
run, leaving no one accountable.
E. MANAGEMENT CONTINUITY
The point just raised brings us to another important issue: continuity.
While pirate organizations have long-term "managers" who are most often the
owners, public institutions have usually 'directors' or 'managers' who move in
very little time to new positions. This high turnover rate creates problems. This
way of functioning creates constantly changing goals and unstability that often
ends up in failure.
Another important difference in the way these two enterprises work is that
while government entities are bogged down by a complicated structure, pirate
organizations are very simple and function in a straight forward way, enabling
them to be operate and more efficiently. Pirate organizations are also more
personal in many ways. Usually settlers or owners of the plots in pirate
settlements are able to talk with the "pirate" who is actually the person
empowered to make decisions. In official institutions, settlers almost never get
the chance to talk directly with the person in charge of the project. They can talk
with many people but they generally do not have any power to take decisions,
but rather are bureaucrats appointed to do certain tasks. This creates an
impersonal and slow way of handling problems. On this point, Mrs. Clemencia
Montes, dweller of a pirate settlement, says:
I had a problem and I was not able to fulfill a payment. I tried
explaining to many official workers what my problem was in order
to find a solution so that I did not lose my house. Although I spoke
with many people it seemed nobody cared or at knew what could
be done on regard to it. I ended loosing my house."78
F. FLEXIBILITY
The point raised by Mrs. Clemencia Montes not only demonstrates the
lack communication channels with decision-makers in government projects, but
the inflexibility that these projects are subject to. Governmental projects are
usually subject to strict rules which can't by any means be broken. In this case,
because Mrs. Clemencia Montes was not able to fulfill a payment she lost her
house. Rules were rules and she definitely did not get the chance to speak to
the person in charge of the program or to some one that could make a decision
regarding the future of her dwelling.
Pirate organizations are much more flexible and do not follow such
general rules. Usually settlers who have bought plots are able to settle
payments in a much more personal and flexible way which fits their budget. If
they are not able to make a payment, they can usually speak with the pirate
about it and work out a different arrangement. In regard to this point Marco
Suarez, a "La Loma" resident says:
When I had problems fulfilling my payment because I lost my job I
talked with "Pacho" and we both agreed to a payment system,
which I was eventually unable to fulfill. This situation was solved
when he took my TV and a radio, but I was lucky I did not lose my
house.79
G. PAYMENT SYSTEM
Marco Suarez raises an important point regarding payment issues. He
arranged to pay his mortgage with his TV and radio. Pirates actually allow a
system of payment which the government is in no position to accept. This
permits their plots to be accessible to a large number of people while still being
profitable for them. Government projects are not capable of handling this form of
78Clemencia Montes. December 15, 1994. "La Loma". Santa Fe de Bogota Colombia.79Marco Suarez. December 15,1994. "La Loma". Santa Fe de Bogota Colombia.
payment because it does not bring the same benefits that it would bring to
pirates since pirates are able to trade goods for money, while the government is
in no position to do the same. Goods of this kind will most probably end up in
the hands of employees or be set aside with nobody to buy them if handled by
official institutions.
H. DIFFERENCE IN ENFORCEMENT METHODS
The government is obviously constrained by its enforcement methods and
obviously is forced to comply with them. The enforcement methods it uses are
in agreement with the law which means that the law is expected to sanction any
wrongdoing. The problem with this way of dealing with disagreements is that
justice is not strong enough in a country like Colombia to fairly handle disputes.
Court processes are usually very long and not very productive due to the costs
needed to implement this method of dispute-resolution. This situation puts
official institutions in a very ackward position especially when dealing with
payments. If the government decided to evict a tenant, it would not hold in the
Colombian system where the laws are much more lenient with residents than
with owners. Also, law mechanisms are time consuming and might take even
years to evict people from their sites. This would indeed cost more than allowing
them to remain. Due to this, official projects almost never collect back
mortgages allowing the settlers, without fulfilling their payments, to stay in their
dwellings.
Pirate organizations on the other hand, have their "payment collection
system" well designed in advance. Because they do not comply with any
governmental system, they use other means to get their money back. A clear
example of this was when 3,500 families were tricked by Clemente Chavez in
Gran Britalia:
Mr. Chavez owned a school in one of the "barrios" and he
established as an essential entrance to enroll, that the student's
parents must be up to date with payments. He also used his sister,
a former nun, to frighten people with "divine" punishments if they
did not fulfill their payments on time. He gave money to the former
priest of the near-by church so that he would bless their homes
and encourage them to keep up to date with their payments. Mr.
Chavez actually gave away a plot of land to a religious group for
the construction of their church if they helped him with gathering
his money. 80
"Other" methods that "pirates" might use to collect payments are much more
extreme. Often, pirates have threatened settlers with personal attacks or even
with killing them or their family members if they don't pay. The truth is that
"pirate urbanizers" have developed a parallel system of justice which is more
efficient for them than the Colombian legislature system. This has obviously
helped them function "better" and fulfill their objectives.
I. POLITICAL SITUATION
Colombian law is generally weak and inefficient due to the current political
situation. The political situation is by no means stable since violence and an
increasing dissatisfaction among people create a constant threat of revolution,
leaving the government in no position to enforce its rules. The fact that the
government's structure is based on legitimacy and support, while pirate
urbanizers are subject merely to self-interest, puts the government in a very
difficult situation which hinders its ability to work in the same way as pirate
urbanizers.
J. PUBLIC IMAGE
a. IN RELATION TO ENFORCEMENT
A constant drawback that the government faces in mimicking pirate
urbanizers work is the image that it reflects. The character of the 'business' or
transaction when a plot of land or dwelling is bought by a dweller changes
completely depending upon who is involved, the government or the "pirate".
Many people who are housed by official institutions feel housing is a duty of the
80Arango E. Carlos. 1986. La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia. Santa Fe de Bogota: ECOE
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government, and thus, feel it should be for free. When the transaction is made
with a "pirate," settlers usually feel more committed to pay.
Colombian people have become used to ignoring official payments
without suffering any major consequences. There have been many cases where
the government has tried to force settlers to pay, threatening to force them to
leave, which almost never happens. People have actually become used to this
situation, and in many cases they know they are better off if they don't pay. The
government has created this lax reputation which is one of its major drawbacks
in terms of providing low-income housing.
Pirate urbanizers, in contrast have the opposite reputation. Residents are
usually afraid of what might happen to them if they don't pay. They have heard
so many stories about what has happened to people who have not paid that they
generally are very committed to pay their mortgages on time.
b. IN RELATION TO QUALITY STANDARDS
Government projects are usually of poor quality. Historically so many
houses have been built without quality standards that public projects have
earned a poor reputation. Pirate urbanizers, however, do not have to deal with
a reputation in the same way the government does. When they start their
business they usually use a brand new name which no one is familiar with. After
they commit their swindles, they are able to choose between the same name
they have used, or use an intermediary's name. In other words, pirates have
mechanisms to rapidly change their reputation, while official projects have a very
hard time altering their image and their reputation.
K. IMPLEMENTATION
Government is often tied up in a rigid system that it created itself. It follows a
land development system which obeys a sequence described by Mr. Baross of:
planninq-servicing-building-occupation. To this system I would add financing,
which I feel is one of the most important constrains government faces.
Financing usually is worded out before and after planning, creating the planning
sequence: Planning, Financing, Planning, servicing, building, and occupation.
Usually projects are first financed because at this beginning stage there is no
money available to devote to planning. Besides, without having any guarantee of
the implementation of the program, most institutions are not willing to commit
time and effort to a project that might not be completed. Financing, however,
requires that the project reaches some planning stage because the entities
committed to this duty are not willing to invest in a project they know nothing
about. As a consequence of this duality, to fulfill the "requirements," housing
institutions are left with only one option: of creating a "fast" plan to present to the
'donor' institutions, which, most of the time do not consider important aspects
which later will play an important role in the development of the project.
If a plan is successful and the loan is granted, institutions are forced to wait
until the money is released. This process generally takes a long time,
sometimes years, and when the money finally reaches the institution, it usually is
worth much less due to inflation. The money is usually first devoted to planning
for a second time, since the project lacks of development. Most of the money is
then frozen for some time while this planning stage gets underway, and the
"paper work" necessary to carry out the project is released. This process will
sometime take years since the system is completely disorganized and often too
old to be efficient and fast. When this stage is finally completed the money
granted for the project usually does not meet the original budget.
Servicing, starts after these processes have been completed. Since the
project from the start has insufficient funds, the institution in charge usually
seeks the easiest way out. Quality is then downgraded as the cheapest
materials are used to compensate for the money shortage. The building
construction stage is also constrained by the lack of money. The project is later
handed to the "settlers" unfinished, and many times with the services already
deteriorated due to low quality materials. By this point in time, the dwellings
have already been sold at a much lower price, giving the government no revenue
and sometimes even creating a loss for the government. In addition, a large
number of people often refuse to make their payments due to the poor quality of
their dwellings, or simply due to lack of money. The government is then forced
to "surrender" without even recouping some of the costs.
This system, as previously seen, is inflexible and is very much constrained by
multiple delays. The project is stymied by a poor start since all delays are
carried through the whole project. This "inflexibility," together with the delays in
transactions, are at fault for the malfunctioning of these projects.
"Pirate organizations" in contrast, follow an opposite schedule since they
work illegally. This schedule is generally the opposite: "occupation-buildinq-
servicing-planning". This structure actually seems to work much better since it
is not constrained by the paper-work process of legitimizing a settlement, which
generally takes several years, increasing costs enormously. Pirates save a
considerable amount of money by skipping the this process. As described by
Mr. Baross and Mr. Van Der Linden:
Such radical breakaways imply a 'no-nonsense' approach which is
typical of the SCRS system (pirate system). Initial standards,
administration and costs are brought down to a bare minimum. 81
The process of legalization (making existent settlements legitimate),
considered by many as the worst of all steps, is generally made by the
government after the "pirate's neighborhood' is finished and when the people are
already living there. At this stage, time is not a major constraint and the settlers
can wait much longer since they are not directly affected.
The government has mimicked some aspects of the way in which informal
housing has developed i.e. flexibility, affordability & cost phasing, provision of
services, sense of community, etc., but none have been entirely successful. It
seems as if an impenetrable "wall" is present which disables government from
working in the same way. Various characteristics have been enumerated in this
chapter to examine the underlying reasons that impede this 'change' from
happening. But once again, what is the main drawback?
81Baross, P. and Linden Cedst. 1990. The Transformation of Land Supply Systems in Third
World Cities. Brookfield, Vermont: Avebury Publishing. p.26.
CONCLUSION
I believe that pirate developments have various characteristics which
probably make them 'superior' to settlements developed in other ways
(government sponsored projects) as outlined in chapter one and summarized as
the following:
1) It is my hypothesis that pirate settlements provide a greater flexibility to
the changing needs of individual households than government sponsored
settlements since dwellers usually have the option of constructing their
own dwelling and of choosing between temporary and durable materials,
according to their budget.
2) I believe pirate settlements are good profit allocators. Since land sold
by pirates generally is outside the urban perimeter, dwellers are able to
buy at relatively low prices. After the settlements become legalized
(meaning that they become legitimate) and utilities are incorporated, the
rise in the price of land becomes a profit for the dwellers. In government
sponsored settlements, in contrast, land is sold after it is inside the urban
perimeter and thus, its price generally is inaccessible for low income
people in need of housing.
3) Pirates provide a more accessible way of providing dwellings for the
poor. Pirates usually are able to finance the projects by their own system
of payments which are variable and which can adjust to fit almost every
kind of budget. Besides, they do not use the judicial system as a way of
enforcing payment; they create their own ways of enforcing it which are
bad in the sense that they do not comply with regulations but good in the
sense these provide a way of accessing credit to the poor.
4) It is my theory that pirate settlements foster a stronger sense of
community than government sponsored projects because since settlers in
pirate settlements face the risk of eviction, this communal anxiety bonds
them together.
Previous studies as well as my research suggests that pirate developments
indeed have qualities that should be enhanced:
Alan Caroll's analysis suggested the need to devise policy interventions
that would eliminate defects of the pirate subdivision business that will be
directed to such social goals as the provision of necessary infrastructure.
He actually proposed modifications in the legal, financial and
administrative institutions which govern land subdivision.
William Doeble's analysis suggested the possibilities for legally
institutionalizing reform to enhance the positive aspects brought by
pirates.
William Blaesser's study agrees that the pirate housing sub-market can
be a market-solution for lower income families provided certain
modifications are made in the legal institutional framework which governs
the operation of that sub-market.
Government seems to agree with these findings since consciously or
unconsciously it has been developing settlements which are similar to pirate
settlements. It is discussed in chapter six and summarized here. The
government has tried to:
1) provide a greater flexibility to the changing needs of individual
households by constructing projects which offer various design
possibilities
2) provide a more accessible way (financially viable way) of providing
dwellings for the poor. It has developed site and service projects and
neighborhoods with minimum standards so that dwellers have a better
chance of owning a dwelling.
3) build community by developing self-help and mutual-help developments
These trials however have not been totally successful since low-income people
in Colombia are still in a need for housing.
My analysis basically differs with the existing ones in that I don't believe in
institutionalizing or legalizing (making the process follow regulations) the pirate
process. I don't believe in organizing pirate developments which are legal at the
on set of development.
To many, the term illegal can be associated with chaos and
disorganization. However, this apparent 'confusion' seems to be highly
organized in pirate developments. Actually, informal developments follow a
certain type of organization which is not written "law" but, which apparently works
in many aspects. This type of "unwritten law" possesses underlying
characteristics which eventually work in this context and probably not in any
other. Government projects may try resemble pirate developments but their
essence remains the same: they continue to be legal (they continue to follow
regulations). I believe that the pirate system works because it is illegal (does not
follow regulations). If it is legalized (in the sense that the process of creating
pirate settlements complies with regulations from the beginning) the essential
qualities that make this system work will be totally jeopardized.
For example it is my belief:
1) The sense of community developed grows because of the risk of
eviction. As soon as the development becomes legal, in the sense that it
complies with regulations, this risk of eviction disappears and thus, the
bonds that hold people together disappear.
2) The pirate system is a good profit allocator because it is sitting on land
which is not part of the urban perimeter (not usable for urban purposes)
and so it costs the settlers little in comparison to land costs for
government sponsored settlements. Besides, since it does not have the
expectation of having services it scares development companies away
from this land. If this land were to be legalized so that it is acceptable for
urban purposes, the prices will immediately rise and the settlement will be
inaccessible for the poor.
3) The system by which pirates finance does not comply with
governmental regulations. They receive barter payments and they
enforce payment by different non-judicial means. If this system were to be
legalized (pirate's behavior were to be in accord with government
dispositions) this characteristic will be totally lost since it had to comply
with judicial regulations.
Will formal settlements always be legal, or is there any possibility for them to
change this status? Can the "veil" of illegality be broken? And if this isn't
possible, what are then the possibilities of finding a solution for housing the poor
in Colombia?
I believe Illegally might indeed complement legality. The answer to
providing housing for the poor might actually be in this realm, in the
interdependence of these two systems. If this coexistence has indeed brought
about benefits for the poor which the legal system by itself has not been able to
provide, why then, end it? This coexistence has actually divided the market in
two, opening a door, although small, for the poor. It has given the poor a small
place in the market which would be totally owned by the rich if illegal settlements
did not exist.
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX A/1
DWELLING DEFICIT IN COLOMBIA
DEFICIT DE vivIENDA
POR REGIONES
ATLNnC. A.tAZO.N, ORuNOQULA c.ENTRO OCCIDENTE
ofurENm
Regiones
PARTICIPACION REGIONAL DENTRO
DEL DEFICIT TOTAL NACIONAL
ATLANTICO 9.49% 1-50% ORINOQULIA
OCCIDENTE 35.22% 53.34% CENTRO
ORIENTE
AMOZONIA 0.45%
Source: La Financiacion de La Vivienda en Colombia. 1992. Instituto Colombiano de Ahorro y
Vivienda.
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APPENDIX A/2
INTERVIEWS
DATE: DECEMBER 1994
PLANEACION NACIONAL
INTERVIEWED LUZ ANGELA MONDRAGON
PATRICIA RENTERIA
PLANEACION DISTRITAL
INTERVIEWED JC
CORPAVI
INTERVIEWED JC
PRIVATE
INTERVIEWED LL
SE MIGUEL ALBA
SE MANUEL ESCOLAR
IS RICARDO PAREDES
INTERVIEWS WITH SETTLERS
DATE: DECEMBER 1994
BARRIO "ZARZAMORA" - INVASION
INTERVIEWED RUMBERTO ZAMBRANO
BARRIO POLICARPA - INVASION
INTERVIEWED MARIA ISABEL MEDINA
BARRIO LAS COLINAS - INVASION
INTERVIEWED MARCO MARTINEZ
BARRIO SAN PEDRO - LEGAL
INTERVIEWED PEDRO HERNANDEZ
BARRIO LA LOMA - PIRATA
INTERVIEWED ALVARO HUERTAS
BARRIO LA LOMA - PIRATA
INTERVIEWED CLEMENCIA MONTES
BARRIO LA LOMA - PIRATA
INTERVIEWED MARCO SUAREZ
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APPENDIX ONE
APPENDIX ONE/1
"LA CASCADA"
INVASION SETTLEMENT
Arango E. Carlos. 1986. La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia, Santa Fe de Bogota: ECOE
Ediciones.
APPENDIX ONE/2
I.C.T. SUBDIVISION OF "DOCE DE OCTUBRE"
LEGAL SETTLEMENT
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Source: I.C.T. Brochure, Medellin.
APPENDIX ONE/3
I.C.T. SUBDIVISION "FRANCISCO ANTONIO ZEA"
LEGAL SETTLEMENT
CLOTHES
BEDROOM IH
BEDROOM fi
1st FLOOR 2nd FLOOR
Source: I.C.T. Brochure, Medellin.
APPENDIX ONE/4
SUBDIVISION PLAN "LA CASTILLA"
PIRATE DEVELOPMENT
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Source: Cock Alvear Hermanos y Cia Ltda.
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APPENDIX ONE/5
"LA CASCADA": EXAMPLES OF FLOOR PLANS DESIGNED BY
RESIDENTS
INVASION DEVELOPMENT
7m 6 Sm
Source: Blaesser, Brian William. 1979. "The Private Market and the Process of Lower Income
Urbanization in Colombia: The Pirate Housing Submarket of Medellin. Boston: Brian William
Blaesser.
APPENDIX ONE/SIX
COMPARISON OF GOVERNMENT HOUSING MARKET AND PIRATE
HOUSING MARKET, MEDELLIN: 1972-1976
ICT:12 DEOCTUBRE CT ZEA EL DIAMANTE ICT 120EOCTUBRE LACASCADA CT: 12DEOCTUBRE
CHARACTERISTICS "TYPE A" 1971 a 1e 1972 1973 "TYPE A" 1974a 19790 "TYPE A' 1976
TOTAL AREA 68.000 M2 102.146 M2 91.940 M2 408.000 2 0.400 M2 408.000 M2
NET AREA 180.000 M2 26.941 M2 41.912 M2 180,000 M2 3.789 M 180,000 M2
TOTAL NO OF LOTS 1,200 448b 100 1.061 31 130
LOT SE 72 M 60 M2 128M2 72 M2 160 M2 72 M
147 M2
AVG LOT AREA CONSTRUCTED M2 20.26M2 Ist FLOOR 40 05M2 88 56 M2 20.26 M2 15 -60 M2 20 26 M2
2nd FLOOR 20 89 M2
UNURBANIED LOT CCST TOTAL NO INFORMATION S8. 029.00 c $4.023.00b NO INFORMATION $1.056 00 b $30.000 00 a
PER METER NO INFORMATION $131.53 c $31.43b NO INFORMATION $5.59
URBANIZED LOT COST TOTAL NO INFORMATION $19.19500 58,832.Oc NO INFORMATION NON VERIFIABLE NO INFORMATION
PERMETER NOINFORMATION $3.14700 $(69.00)d NO INFORMATION CONT DATA NO INFORMATION
HOUSE CONSTRUCTION COST NO INFORMATION $28,45000 $13,280 - $26,560 d NO INFORMATION S 14 - 20.000 $45.30000a
TOTAL COST I NO INFORMATION S47,645 00 $20 - 40.000 e NO INFORMATION $32- 18000 $75.300 00 a
SELLING PRCE $22.500 00b 49.000 ($20 - 40.,000)f $55.000 5 32 - 18000 590.000 00 b
$26,000 00c
S41,762 00d
DOWNPA
T
MENT 0 OR $3,000 9,800 $1.500q $10.000 00 $2.000 $17 000 00 b
INSTALLMENT $85.47c isI YEAR 541739 $227 00g IsI.YEAR 552751 $27000 Ist YEAR 855 00 b
PAYMENTSMO $118 00d (5% INCREASE/YR) (5% INCREASEYR.) (5% INCREASE YR)
PAYMENT PER 15 YRS (180 MOS.)c 13 YRS. (156 MONTHS) 5YRS.(60MONTHS) 12 YRS (140 MONTHS) 4 YRS (48 MONTHS) 12 YRS (144 MONTHS) b
I YRS (216 MOS )d
INTEREST CHARGES 0%ON ANNUAL BAL 11% ON ANNUAL SAL 24% ON ANNUAL BAL 12% ON ANNUAL BAL. 18% ANNUALLY ON BAL 12 ON ANNUAL BAL b
2% FOR INSUR 2% FOR INSUR 0 5% FINANCE CHO 2% FOR INSUR OVERDUE AFTER 2% FOR INSUR
4 YRS TERM
SERVICES ALL PROVIDED ALL PROVIDED NON PROVIDED ALL PROVIDED NON PROVIDED ALL PROVIDED
(CONTRABAND)
OPEN SPACE 26% 11 427 M2 (13%) 22 077 M2 (24%) 26% MINNMAL 26%
COMMUNIY SERVICES HEALTH CTR/ 2 SCHOOL. HOSPITAL SCHOOL HEALTH CTR/ 2 SCHOOL & CHURCH HEALTH CTRj 2
SCHOOLS/POLICE/ (NEARBY) CHURCH SCHOOLS/POLICE/ IN NEARBY BARRIO SCHOOLS/IPOLICEi
CHURCH/MARKET CHURCHMARKET CHURCHMARKET
SPORTS AREA SPORTS AREA SPORTS AREA
Source: Blaesser, Brian William. 1979. "The Private Market and the Process of Lower Income
Urbanization in Colombia: The Pirate Housing Submarket of Medellin. Boston: Brian William
Blaesser.
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APPENDIX ONE/7
AVERAGE LOT PRICES PER M2 ACROSS RINGS AND SECTORS OF
BOGOTA
WEST
NORTH/NORTH'
SOU71
Fizsc Second Outside
Ring Ring Perimecer
-10 a 11-20 I:n Over 20 'x:
(Kilcmeters from center)
Average lot Prices per 12 across rings and sectors of Bogota
Source: Mackenzie, James Russel. 1987. "The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Alternatives in
the Context of Rapid Urban Growth: A Case Study of Bogota", Houston: U.M.|.
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APPENDIX ONE/8
AMOUNT OF INVESTMENT BY LOT PURCHASERS IN "LA CASCADA"
AS OF 1975
INVASION DEVELOPMENT
Family Yearly
Monthly Lot Resource(s) Used Area Time al AverageIncome Price To Finance M2 Period Amount Amt. nves-
Range (S) (S) Construction Constr. (yrs) () 'ted (S)
3,000 cesantlas + accid. 64.0 4.5 32,000 7,111
compensation
7,500 cesantlas + savings 51.2 5.0 20,000 4,000
1,500 7,500 cesantras + savings 10.2 0.8 6,540 6.540
or 7,5001 loan frcm factory 15.0 1 week 12,100 12,100
less 15,000 cesantias 64.0 2.0 18,000 9,000
13,000 rent from agric. 31.7 1.5 19,000' 12,000
plot
17,000 salary 16.0110 .0 2,000 2,000
16,000 sale of prior home 32.0 1.0 15,000 15,000
5,000 salary + savings 32.0 3.0 8,000 2,666
6,250 sale of prior home -35.2 9.0 40,000 1 4,444
6,250 salary + savings 70.4 7.0 25,000 3,571
9,500 salary 32.0 4.0 1 ,0 00b 250
7,500 general savings 64.0 1.0 8,000 8,000
1,501 9,000 general savings 51.2 2.0 40,00C 13,333
10,000 Loan, relative/friend 35.2 2.0 10,000 5,000
3,000 17,000 loan through company 76.0 0.2 35,000 35,00C
"housing fund"
15,600 cesantias + salary 16.0 0.2 20,000 20,000
(gift) tensantzas + gift 44.8 1.0 18,000 19,000
5,000 Igeneral savings 23.2 1.0 1,100 1,100
16,000 salary 61.4 1.0 18,000 13,000
3,001 8,050 salary + savings 51.2 1.0 18,000 13,300
.14,000 loan, savings, home 64.0 2.5 25,400 10,160
5,000sale
15,000 salary 64.0 3.0 40,000 13,333
Notes
a nvestment totals include cost of materials and contracred labcr, but de
not include the unpaid labor of familv members.
House already constructed on lot at time of curchas e.
Source: Blaesser, Brian William. 1979. "The Private Market and the Process of Lower Income
Urbanization in Colombia: The Pirate Housing Submarket of Medellin. Boston: Brian William
Blaesser.
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APPENDIX ONE/9
LAYOUT OF "EL DIAMANTE"
PIRATE DEVELOPMENT
II,
37
_ _ I 1
_______~ 
,- '..
- .
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- I
Zig
K 8.
Source: Blaesser, Brian William. 1979. "The Private Market and the Process of Lower Income
Urbanization in Colombia: The Pirate Housing Submarket of Medellin. Boston: Brian William
Blaesser.
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APPENDIX ONE/10
PEDESTRIAN AND OPEN SPACE STRUCTURE OF
BARRIO "GARCEZ NAVAS"
LEGAL
Source: Mackenzie, James Russel. 1987. "The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Alternatives in
the Context of Rapid Urban Growth: A Case Study of Bogota", Houston: U.M.\.
APPENDIX TWO
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APPENDIX TWO/1
Source: Arango E. Carlos. 1986. La Lucha por la Vivienda en Colombia. Santa Fe de Bogota:
ECOE Ediciones.
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APPENDIX THREE
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APPENDIX THREE/i
COSTO DE TERRENO DE TRES BARRIOS PIRATAS DE BOGOTA
(COST OF LAND OF THREE PIRATE BARRIOS IN BOGOTA)
LOT COST ALCALA ACACIA ALQUERIAS
1,000 TO 2,000 31.80% 8.70%
2,000 TO 5,000 13.80% 34.90% 11.50%
3,000 TO 13,000 13.60% 32.10% 3.00%
13,000 TO 15,000 9.00% 4.30% 34.60%
15,000 TO 20,000 13.60%
20,000 TO 40,000 9.00% 3.50%
40,000 TO 80,000 9.00%
Source: Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Nacional. 1973. El Mercadeo de Tierras en
Barrios Clandestinos de Bogota, Santa Fe de Bogota, Colombia.
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APPENDIX THREE/2
Los siguientes c6lculos proceden sobre los mismos supuestos del ejemplo
presentado en el capitulo 11, secci6n G, y se basan en datos de la Escritura
N9 233, del 28 de enero de 1966 (en la Notaria 10).
A. Area total comprada = 53.381 mts2 por $ 668.262 (pesos de 1966).
B. Area cedida para vias (25% de 53.381) = 13.345 mts2.
C. Area vendible (A - B) = 40.036.
D. 10 /. de C que, por hip6tesis, no se pudo vender = 4.004 mts2.
E. Flujo de ingresos.
(Por suposici6n, todos los lotes fueron vendidos el 19 de enero de 1967).
Lotes vendidos: 6rea = 36.032 mts2, valor promedio por mt2 $ 87.85
(pesos de 1967). Valor neto (36.032 x 87.85) = 3.165.411.
Afio Concepto Ingresos($ de 1966)
1967
1968
1969
1970
Cuotas iniciales
Amortizaci6n e intereses
Amortizaci6n e intereses
Amortizaci6n e intereses
Amortizaci6n e intereses
732.734
704.795
607.744
502.367
421.083
2.968.723
F. Flujo de egresos.
(5 corrientes) ($ 1966)
1966 Vias 100.000 100.000
Comisionistas 50.000 50.000
Oficinas 50.000 - 50.000
1967 Comisionistas 50.000 46.296
Oficinas 50.000 46.296
292.592
G. Beneficio bruto (ingresos menos egresos) = 2.676.131 (pesos de 1966).
H. Beneficio bruto actualizado (suponiendo costo de oportunidad del capital del
10% anual) = 2.187.467 (pesos de 1966).
1. Relaci6n -beneficio/costo (2.187.467/668.262) 3.273.
I Ran-firin neto (sin incluir pago de impuestos) = 227/. (en cinco aios).
Source: Lora Lozada Rodrigo, Gomez Buendia Hernando, 1976. La Tierra en el Mercado Pirata
de Bogota. Santa Fe de Bogota.
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APPENDIX THREE/3
POTENTIAL DEVELOPER PROFITS: EL DIAMANTE 1973
INFRASTRUCTURE SOLUTIONS COST M2 PER LOT PRICE PROF.
SOLUTION
A. SOLUTION PROVISIONALLY AP-
PROVED BY MUNICIPAL PLAN-
NING DEPT., JUNE, 1972
(ACTA NO. 15) $12,032 ($94/m2) 69
a. Bulldozing of roads $55.69/m2 $14,393 ($112/m2) 101
($4.55/m2)
b. Latrine system $17,406 ($136/m2) 144
($0.57/m2)
c. Water ($12.09/m2)
B. SOLUTION ACTUALLY IMPLE-
MENTED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH MEMORANDUM OF AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN DEVELOPER
AND EMPRESAS PUBLICAS,
AUGUST, 1974 $12,032 ($94/m2) 82
a. Bulldozing of roads $51.631m2 $14,393 ($112/m2) 117
($4.55/m2)
b. Developer contribution $17,406 ($136/m2) 163
of $400,000 for sewer-
age ($9.11/m2) con-
structed by Empresas Publicas
C. SOLUTION: ALL SERVICE IN-
FRASTRUCTURE PROVIDED BY
DEVELOPER $12,032 ($94/m2) 25
a. Bulldozing of roads $75.26/m2 $14,393 ($112/m2) 49
($4.55/m2)
b. Sewerage ($12.66/m2) $17,406 ($136/m2) 81
c. Water ($12.09/m2)
d. Electricity ($5.00/m2)
Source: Blaesser, Brian William. 1979. "The Private Market and the Process of Lower Income
Urbanization in Colombia: The Pirate Housing Submarket of Medellin. Boston: Brian William
Blaesser.
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APPENDIX FOUR
APPENDIX FOUR/i
"TINTAL" AXIS FOR URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Limite de la concentraci6n
- Obras de Acueducto
Disefo Editorial / EL TIEMPO
Source: El Tiempo, September 1, 1994, Tintal, Polo de Desarollo Urbano, Santa Fe de Bogota.
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APPENDIX FOUR/2
INURBE
The existing Instituto de Credito Territorial (ICT) which was in charge of
developing legal settlements in the 1990's changed its name and has converted
in the Inurbe (Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Urbana - National Institute of the
Urban Reform). This "new" institution (Inurbe) is now in charge of administering
subsidies for low-income people. Currently, the dwellers have become in charge
of searching for their own solution, while the government helps them by providing
subsidies. These subsidies are given, for new dwellings and for upgrades. They
are usually not given directly to the people, but rather to the development
companies in charge of construction.
The process works as follows: Private developers interested in providing
low-income housing must present projects to the Inurbe in order to be approved
and receive subsidies. These settlements are incorporated into a long list which
is given to the people who are interested in receiving these subsidies. The
interested people are asked to fill out some forms which need to be approved by
Inurbe. After these forms are approved, low-income people are able to choose
from the long list of projects the one that fits them best. The cheaper the
dwelling is, the more of a subsidy they receive. After the development is chosen,
the money is given directly to the private developers and so, the currency never
gets touched by the people but, instead, is represented in their dwelling.
This approach has actually achieved good results. First, the
government has benefited because it has fled from construction, a field that
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requires a managerial infrastructure that the government is not prepared to
handle. Benefits, thus, have followed as the government no longer must deal
with contractors and employees who increase the levels of bureaucracy, and
raise the costs unpredictably.
A second benefit goes to the private sector which is given a chance to
participate in housing the poor, while earning a profit. The existence of many
private developing firms also generates profits for the eventual settlers since the
market competition that is created allows settlers to choose where he/she wants
to live. In essence, firms compete, offering different deals to attract people to
their projects. The array of options that dwellers have, thus expands, and many
times people are able to find projects that meet their needs. The incorporation
of private firms also insures that projects get finished.
Thus the government is left with an easier job, which allows for better
administration of resources. The dynamics of the process also insures, to a
certain extent, that the subsidies are given on the level in which they are needed.
This flexibility is present because the dwellings that the people select are
matched to subsidies which decrease as the dwelling unit appreciates. In other
words, the underlying assumption, is that people with less income buy lower-
value houses, and thus, benefit with higher subsidies. Finally, since the people
do not touch the resources, there is no risk that the money would be diverted to
other expenses.
The system, however, has serious drawbacks. Probably the biggest one
is that although it attempts to house the low-income class, it does not target the
lowest-income group. To classify for these projects, people need a stable job to
be able to pay off their debt. Settlers with no steady stream of money are still
left outside with no way of owning a dwelling.
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APPENDIX FIVE/1
DATE: AUGUST 24, 1994
PLACE: PLANEACION DISTRITAL, SANTA FE DE BOGOTA
ORAL QUESTION:
work
If you did not work in legalization matters do you think you would still
in this institution?
FIVE OUT OF SEVEN PEOPLE ASKED SAID THEY WOULD NOT
NO NAMES WERE ASKED
APPENDIX FIVE/2
COLOMBIA, SOCIAL CLASS STRUCTURE IN PERCENT OF TOTAL
POPULATION
Up! :Iasi515% w Pih3
Middle Class
15%
Upper lower Class
lower Class
50%
Misses
3011
Source: Mackenzie, James Russel. 1987. "The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Alternatives in
the Context of Rapid Urban Growth: A Case Study of Bogota", Houston: U.M.I.
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